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The United States Copper Industry in the
World Market: Running Hard Yet
Losing Ground
"Now here, you see," said the Red Queen to Alice, "it takes all the running
you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else,
you must run at least twice as fast as that."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States copper industry has been running hard against its
foreign competitors, yet it has lost ground. The industry has significantly
reduced production costs while complying with costly environmental
regulations and confronting the lowest copper prices this century while
witnessing a dramatic increase in imports. Despite these efforts, and the
recent spectacular rise in copper prices, imports have penetrated deep
into the United States domestic market, and employment in the domestic
copper industry has dropped to half of what it was in 1980. The United
States copper industry decline is due in part to lower production costs of
foreign producers arising from cheaper labor and higher grade ore.
However, the failure of the United States to establish a comprehensive
and coordinated national copper policy has also contributed to the near
demise of the domestic industry. Even though the price of copper im-
proved dramatically in the last half of 1987, reaching record highs, the
lack of policy has injured the industry and continues to do so. Moreover,
the failure of the United States to establish a national policy also affects
broader interests,2 such as diplomatic relations between the United States
1 L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF LEWIS CAR-
ROLL 166 (1984)(emphasis in original), cited in T. MORAN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND
THE POLITICS OF DEPENDENCE 71 (1974).
2 Industrialized nations are dependent upon critical copper imports. In recent years, the reli-
ance by developed nations has grown to 40% of consumption. D. MEZGER, COPPER IN THE
WORLD ECONOMY 19 (1980). Likewise, the importance of copper to United States industries cannot
be understated. As evidence of its importance, legislators in recent sessions of Congress have intro-
duced bills relating to copper on a wide variety of subjects.
Thus far in the 100th Congress, bills have been introduced on subjects ranging from interna-
tional lending policies, H.R. Res. 149, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 1043, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987); to foreign relations, S. 709, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1561, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987); to international environmental policies, S. 316, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 321, 100th
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and developing copper-exporting countries,3 national defense,4 the
United States trade deficit,5 border relations between the United States
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1664, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1679, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987); to international human rights, see infra note 3. For a detailed discussion of these legislative
initiatives, see infra notes 195-202 and accompanying text.
Legislation in the 99th Congress included measures to: require the negotiation of voluntary
trade restriction agreements, S. 627, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 1520, 99th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1985); H.R. 3714, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 1562, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1985);
establish limitations on multilateral assistance to foreign copper producers, S. 2815, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 113(c)(1986); see also S. Rep. No. 440, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6; impose a tariff on imported
copper to offset the cost incurred by domestic producers to comply with environmental regulations,
S. 353, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); establish quotas on imported copper, S. 351, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985); and establish an inter-governmental committee on copper, S. 1670, 99th Cong., 1st Sess
(1985); H.R. 3410, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). See generally infra notes 187-93 and accompanying
text.
In the 98th Congress, copper-related bills included bills directing copper be purchased for the
national stockpile, S. 1544, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); restricting imports of copper, H.R. 1318
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); and increasing the duty on imported copper to equalize costs incurred
by domestic producers in complying with United States environmental regulations, H.R. 2413, 98th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1983). See generally infra notes 168-86 and accompanying text.
3 Copper is a critical export for several developing countries, particularly Chile, Peru, Zaire,
and Zambia. See infra notes 98, 99 and accompanying text. "In terms of export value, copper is by
far the most important nonfuel export of the developing countries. For example, the average com-
bined value of exports of bauxite, iron ore, manganese, lead, tin, and zinc by the developing countries
over the 1970-72 period was $2.2 billion, as contrasted with $2.4 billion for the average value of
copper exports by developing countries over this period." R. MIKESELL, THE WORLD COPPER
INDUsTRY 37 (1979). Clearly, United States policies affecting copper are of special import to these
copper-dependent, developing countries.
Due to congressional concern over human rights violations in Chile, prohibitions on the impor-
tation of Chilean copper are occasionally urged. See, eg., S. 709, supra note 2; H.R. 1561, supra note
2. See also Proclamation No. 5758, 52 Fed. Reg. 49129 (1987)(suspension of preferential treatment
for Chile under Generalized System of Preferences); U.S. Ending Duty-Free Designation on Copper,
Other Chilean Imports, Ariz. Daily Star, Dec. 25, 1987, at A3, col. 1.
4 "Because of its conductivity, copper is an essential ingredient in modem electronic warfare.
Because of its malleability, it is an essential ingredient in all forms of munitions. ... Because of its
resistance to weathering, it is frequently specified for front-line equipment." T. NAVIN, COPPER
MINING & MANAGEMENT 5 (1978). Copper is a better electrical conductor than all metals except
silver. R. BOWEN & A. GUNATILAKA, COPPER: ITS GEOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 1 (1977). "Be-
cause copper ranks after steel and explosives as an important item in the nation's warring capability,
the United States government has... periodically taken a great interest in the administration of the
industry." T. NAVIN, supra, at 8. "During wartime, copper consumption increases dramatically
because of its use in ammunition as shell casings and in other military hardware." R. MIKESELL,
supra note 3, at 74. Recognizing its importance as a strategic material, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency considers copper to be a strategic mineral under 50 U.S.C. § 98 (1982). See
infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text. But see U.S. Assistance to Foreign Copper Producers and
the Effects on Domestic Industries and Environmental Standards: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Mining, Forest Management, and Bonneville Power Administration of the House Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 260-61 (1983)("The ability to substitute [materials such as
aluminum and plastic for copper] limits the concept of copper as a critical material.")[hereinafter
U.S. Assistance to Foreign Copper Producers]. See generally McClure, Stockpiling of Strategic and
Critical Minerals, 19 IDAHO L. REV. 417 (1983).
5 The United States has imported copper in increasing amounts, and its share of worldwide
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and Mexico, 6 and the competitiveness of other domestic industries.7
The domestic copper industry is a national one,8 directly affected by
seemingly unrelated policies, ranging, for instance, from International
Monetary Fund ("IMF") and Multilateral Development Bank
("MDB") 9 lending policies to policies underlying the implementation of
the Clean Air Act.'" Yet the United States has no comprehensive na-
tional copper policy. Rather, current policy consists primarily of frag-
mented decisions made without a broad view of the needs of the nation
or the domestic copper industry. This Comment first surveys the world
production has decreased, thus affecting the balance of trade. See infra notes 71-72 and accompany-
ing text.
6 See, e.g., Agreement on Transboundary Air Pollution Caused by Copper Smelters Along
Their Common Border, Jan. 29, 1987, United States-Mexico, 25 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 33
(1987); Agreement on Environmental Cooperation in the Border Area, Aug. 14, 1983, United States-
Mexico, reprinted in 22 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1025 (1985); Note, International Agreements 25
HARV. INT'L L.J. 239 (1984); S. 321, supra note 2; H.R. 1664, supra note 2; H.R. 1679, supra note 2;
U.S., Mexico Reach Agreement on Smelters, Sewage Treatment Facility in Tijuana Area, 16 ENV'T.
REP. (BNA) 512, July 26, 1985. See generally Bath, U.S.-Mexico Experience in Managing Trans-
boundary Air Resources: Problems, Prospects, and Recommendations for the Future, 22 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 1147 (1982); Applegate, A Discussion of U.S.-Mexico Experience in Managing
Transboundary Air Resources: Problems, Prospects, and Recommendations for the Future, 22 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 1168 (1982).
7 For example:
The United States is the world's largest producer and consumer of brass mill products, includ-
ing brass strip. Copper and brass mill products ... are used by thousands of large and small
enterprises located throughout the United States in the production of final products. The five
major markets for copper and brass mill products are for building and construction, electrical
and electronic products, industrial machinery and equipment, consumer and general products,
and transportation equipment.
The Effect of Changes in the Value of the U.S. Dollar on Trade in Selected Commodities, USITC
Pub. 1423, Inv. No. 1423 (Sept. 1983)[hereinafter Commodities Investigation].
8 At its 1980 peak, the industry employed some 45,000. NONFERROUS METALS, 1986 U.S.
INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 20-1 (1985)[hereinafter NONFERROUS METALS]. Mines or smelters were
operated in eight states: Michigan, Montana, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, and
Texas. T. NAVIN, supra note 4, at 380-83. However, two-thirds of all domestically produced copper
is mined in southeastern Arizona, from an area a few miles north of the border between the United
States and Mexico. U.S. Assistance to Foreign Copper Producers, supra note 4, at 81; U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, 1986 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (106th ed. 1985) 711 [here-
inafter 1986 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. One-third of domestic refiner capacity is located in Texas.
Unwrought Copper, USITC Pub. 1549, Inv. No. TA-201-52 (July 1984). The text of Unwrought
Copper, without its appendix, is reprinted in 6 INT'L TRADE REP. DECISIONS 1708 (1985). Cita-
tions to the text of Unwrought Copper are cited to that reprint. Citations to its appendix are to
LEXIS, ITrade library, ITC file.
9 Unless otherwise noted, multilateral development banks ("MDBs") include the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, the Inter-
national Finance Corporation, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Inter-American Invest-
ment Corporation, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, and the African
Development Fund.
10 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1982).
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copper industry, its recent history, and present condition."t It then ad-
dresses the ability of the domestic copper industry to compete on the
world market, with focus on market factors, objective business considera-
tions, and United States government policy. 2 Discussion of recent con-
gressional attempts to assist the industry follows. 3 Finally, the
Comment suggests the basic elements necessary for a national copper
policy. 14
II. BACKGROUND: THE STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD COPPER
INDUSTRY
A. The General Structure of the Industry
The domestic industry has long been dominated by a few United
States corporations: Duval, Cyprus, Anaconda, Phelps Dodge,
ASARCO, Kennecott, AMAX, and Newmont.' 5 With the exception of
Newmont, these companies have pursued vertical integration16 in order
to own and control operations in each of the four principal stages of
copper production (mining, milling, smelting, and refining).' 7 The cop-
per industry produces copper as an intermediate good which is sold to
fabricators which then manufacture end or other intermediate prod-
ucts. II Only a few companies have integrated forward to the fabrication
stage.t 9
The world copper industry is in transition.20 From its inception and
until about 1970, the world market was in large part controlled by the
United States corporations mentioned above. That initial dominance was
due in large part to the capital-intensive nature of copper mining: "total
investment costs for large open-pit mines are seldom less than several
hundred million dollars; in some cases they amount to $1 billion ....
I1 See infra notes 15-101 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 102-61 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 162-98 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 199-245 and accompanying text.
15 See T. NAVIN, supra note 4, at 6-9. See generally id. at 202-303; R. MIKESELL, supra note 3,
at 38-42.
16 R. MIKESELL, supra note 3, at 16.
17 T. NAVIN, supra note 4, at 8. See also T. MORAN, supra note 1, at 40-42 (1974)(vertical
integration was pursued by producers for strategic business reasons).
18 See T. NAVIN, supra note 4, at 8.
19 Id.
20 For a survey of the history of the industry from its ancient origins to the 1970s, see R. PRAIN,
COPPER-THE ANATOMY OF AN INDUSTRY 63-79 (1975).
21 UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, TRANSNATIONAL CORPO-
RATIONS IN THE COPPER INDUSTRY, 18 U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/21, U.N. Sales No. E.811I.A.E.
(1981)[hereinafter TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS]. Further hampering development of copper
mines by developing countries was the factor that
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At the same time, "[t]o open up a new mine of any considerable size
takes perhaps five years from the date of decision to go ahead-and this
decision itself is often deferred for many years after discovery of an ore-
body."22 Over the past twenty years, however, United States dominance
has diminished and the recently nationalized copper industries of Chile,23
Peru,24 Zaire,25 and Zambia 26 have captured a large share of the world
market.27 A substantial proportion of foreign production is now under
the extent of the capital required depends largely on the degree of existing development in the
area in which the new mine is to be located. All too often there is practically no development at
all and infrastructure will have to be built up from scratch to include roads, railways, power
stations, water supplies, airfields and other services.
R. PRAIN, supra note 20, at 186. Developing countries, by definition, have less infrastructure in
place, making the cost of opening a mine greater than in developed countries.
22 R. PRAIN, supra note 20, at 52-53.
23 See generally Velasco, The Mineral Industry of Chile, in U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, [1985] 1
MINERALS YEARBOOK, Metals and Minerals 195-202 (1986)[hereinafter 1985 MINERALS YEAR-
BOOK]; T. MORAN, supra note 1; Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, app. (83% of Chile's production
is by the state-owned Corporation National del Cobre de Chile ("Codelco"), which was created in
1976); G. INGRAM, EXPROPRIATION OF U.S. PROPERTY IN SOUTH AMERICA 211-321 (1974)(expro-
priation of copper production facilities by Chile valued in 1971 at $1 billion from two United States
corporations); N. GIRVAN, COPPER IN CHILE (1972); M. LASAGA, THE COPPER INDUSTRY IN THE
CHILEAN ECONOMY (1981)(econometric analysis of the Chilean copper industry and economy).
24 See generally U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, The Mineral Industry of Peru, in 1985 MINERALS
YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at 861-86; 1975 MINERALS FACTS AND PROBLEMS 295 (1976).
25 See generally U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, The Mineral Industry of Zaire, in 1985 MINERALS
YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at 967-72 (1986); Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, app. (80% of Zairian
production is from state-owned mines).
26 Nationalization in Zambia began in 1969. See generally M. FABER & J. POTTER, TOWARDS
ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE 91-95 (1971); U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, The Mineral Industry in
Zambia, in 1985 MINERALS YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at 975-78 (1986); C. MPHAISHA, A STUDY
OF ZAMBIA'S COPPER POLICY: NATIONALIZATION, MARKET INTERVENTION, DEEP SEABED Ex-
PLOITATION (1979); Ndulo, Mining Legislation and Mineral Development in Zambia, 19 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 1, 9-11 (1986). See also C. OBIDEGWU & M. NZIRAMASANGA, COPPER AND ZAMBIA
(198 1)(econometric analysis of the Zambian copper industry); W. PETERS, ARBITRATION AND RE-
NEGOTIATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 33-40 (1986); G. MHONE, THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A DUAL LABOR MARKET IN AFRICA (1982).
27 US. Assistance to Foreign Copper Producers, supra note 4, at 34-35. Until the late 1960s the
seven largest copper corporations controlled 70% of copper production. The nationalization of the
copper industries in Chile, Zambia, Peru, and Zaire, the lowering of entry costs to the industry
(which permitted additional small firms to begin mining), and the entry of oil companies into the
copper arena combined to severely reduce this concentration. TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS,
supra note 21, at 29-43. See R. MIKESELL, supra note 3, at 28-31. See generally T. NAVIN, supra
note 4, at 335-62. Oil companies, however, are divesting their copper subsidiaries. Nonferrous Met-
als, supra, note 8, at 20-1.
There are a number of factors that attracted additional entrepreneurs to the industry, including:
1) "the continuing discovery of large new sources of copper," T. MORAN, supra note 1, at 32; 2) war-
time subsidies made by the United States during and following World War II that were offered to
finance new companies or help smaller companies expand production, id. at 33; 3) the strategy of
"smelting, refining, and fabricating companies to integrate backwards to their own supplies .... [in
order] to develop sources at the mining stage," id. at 34; 4) "the willingness of fabricators and
consumers of copper to finance the growth of new small copper miners and be paid back in output,"
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control of the governments of these countries. In short, the number of
producers and world production capacity have increased, and the market
share of domestic producers has decreased.28 In 1982 Chile replaced the
United States as the world's largest copper producer,29 and reliance by
the United States on imports of refined copper set a record high in
1986.30
B. The Market for Copper
Copper is used in durable goods, including electrical production and
transmission equipment, automobiles, construction, electrical devices,
plumbing, consumer goods, military applications, and coinage.31 These
are the products of industrialized,, developed countries and thus, con-
id.; 5) "a drive on the part of natural resource companies that have not traditionally been associated
with copper to diversify by forming or buying a mining subsidiary." Id. at 35.
28 T. NAVIN, supra note 4, at 6-7. The United States share of the world market declined from
26% in 1970 to 14% in 1984. 1986 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 8, at 679. In millions of
metric tons, mining production was:
1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 % Change
U.S. 1.56 1.28 1.18 1.54 1.15 1.04 1.10 1.11 1.15 -26
Chile .71 .83 1.07' 1.08 1.24 1.26 1.29 1.23 1.28 +80
Peru .22 .18 .37 .34 .35 .32 .36 .39 .40 +82
Zaire .39 .50 .53 .55 .52 .54 .56 .50 .48 +23
Zambia .68 .68 .60 .59 .57 .54 .53 .52 .50 -26
Source: U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, [1971] 1 MINERALS YEARBOOK, Metals, Minerals, and Fuels 490
(1970); U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, [1976] 1 MINERALS YEARBOOK, Metals and Minerals 517-18
(1977)(1975 data); U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, [1984] 1 MINERALS YEARBOOK, Metals and Minerals
(1985)(1980-1981 data); U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, Copper, PREPRINT FROM THE 1986 BUREAU OF
MINES MINERALS YEARBOOK, 51-2 (1987)(1982-1984 data)[hereinafter 1986 MINERALS YEAR-
BOOK]; AMERICAN BUREAU OF METAL STATISTICS INC., NON-FERROUS METAL DATA 1986 at 9
(1987)(1985-1986 data)[hereinafter NON-FERROUS METAL DATA]. The data was converted, as nec-
essary, to metric tons.
The decline in Zambia's copper production is due to a combination of Zambian policy to reduce
production in order to conserve its copper resources, IMF-mandated austerity measures, low copper
prices, and labor and social unrest. See Glory That Was Copper Lets Zambia Down, N.Y. Times,
June 17, 1987, at A18, col. 1; Millions of Zambians Hit by Economic Hardships, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22,
1987, at A8, col. 3; 1986 MINERAL YEARBOOK, supra, at 27-8. Even the high prices of late 1987 and
early 1988 have not helped Zambia significantly. See Copper a Bright Spot in Zambia's Economy,
Chicago Trib., Nov. 15, 1987, § 7, at 8, col. 1.
29 See 1985 MINERALS YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at 373-74.
30 133 CONG. REC. 55239 (1987)(statement of Senator Domenici). 1985 had also been a record
year for imports, NON-FERROUS METAL DATA supra note 28, at 336.
31 See T. NAVIN, supra note 4, at 74; R. MIKESELL, supra note 3, at 74, 140. However, because
of a change in the copper content of pennies, United States use of copper in coinage has dropped
markedly. See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text; D. HARGREAVES, WORLD INDEX OF
STRATEGIC MINERALS 66 (1983); D. MEZGER, supra note 2, at 33. Consumption in the United
States in 1985 by end use was: "electrical, 65%; construction, 18%; machinery, 6%; transportation,
5%; ordnance, 2%; other, 4%." 1985 MINERALS YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at 332.
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sumption of copper is closely related to the development of a nation.32
While developed nations do consume proportionally more copper than
developing nations, their demand has nonetheless leveled off. 33 Indeed,
domestic demand for copper is no longer growing in proportion to the
growth of the United States Gross National Product ("GNP"). 34 "The
reason for this is easy to understand for there is a limit to the number of
motor cars, washing machines, television sets and other equipment
designed for ease of living which a family can use . . . . ,3' Likewise,
world demand is down. 36 This lessened demand has been attributed to
several factors.
First, there are readily available substitutes for copper which, if cop-
per is not price-competitive, may be used in its stead (demand for copper
being fairly elastic). For example, aluminum and plastics are increas-
ingly used as substitutes for copper in heat-exchange, electrical, and
plumbing applications.37 Similarly, the increasing use of optical fibers
and microwave and satellite technologies, coupled with the general mini-
aturization of electronics, has further reduced demand for copper.38 In
32 "About half of the copper employed for consumer goods is used in durables such as washing
machines, refrigerators, radios, televisions, phonographs, tape recorders, and cutlery." R. MIKE-
SELL, supra note 3, at 74. "[C]hanges in the level of industrial production of durable manufacturers
are highly correlated with changes in the consumption of refined copper." Unwrought Copper,
supra note 8, app.
33 Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, at 1723 n.52, app. See generally R. MIKESELL, supra note
3, at 15 (consumption of copper by developed nations ten times that of developing nations).
34 Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, app. In fact, domestic consumption of refined copper has
decreased since 1973, falling 19.3% by 1983. Id. at 1721. See generally id. at 1721-23. However,
this trend has at least temporarily changed: the demand for copper increasing in 1987 by 7%.
Copper Rally Continues; Price Near 8-Year High, Chicago Trib., Nov. 12, 1987, § 2, at 6, col. I
[hereinafter Copper Rally Continues].
35 R. PRAIN, supra note 20, at 263.
36 See Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, at 1723; but see Copper Rally Continues, supra note 34
(demand up in 1987).
37 Commodities Investigation, supra note 7. The threat of substitution by aluminum did not
become a major concern of domestic copper producers until after World War II. T. MORAN, supra
note 1, at 45-49. Aluminum substitutes for copper primarily in applications involving electrical
conduction. R. BOWEN & A. GUNATILAKA, supra note 4, at 306-07. Plastics threaten copper in
plumbing applications. Id. at 307.
Copper is not mined as cheaply as is aluminum: "Copper is relatively difficult to extract from
the earth .... [A] bauxite mine may contain 35 percent aluminum; but a copper mine may contain
only 0.5 percent copper." T. NAVIN, supra note 4, at 1. Copper producing involves separating
tremendous amounts of waste material from the ore itself; the higher the ore content, the less waste
to remove, the lower the cost to produce. At the same time, the technology of aluminum production
has advanced ahead of copper production technology, leading to a decrease in the relative produc-
tion cost of aluminum. D. MEZGER, supra note 2, at 35.
38 Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, at 1713. See R. PRAIN, supra note 20, at 166 (effects of
miniaturization). In addition, substitutes threaten copper in: 1) thinner gauges of wire; 2) mul-
tiplexing; 3) telecommunications; 4) digital systems; 5) electronic switching. 1985 MINERALS YEAR-
BOOK, supra note 23, at 333.
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addition, since 1973 increasing energy costs have motivated manufactur-
ers of equipment and automobiles to utilize lighter alternatives to cop-
per.39 "[C]opper consumption has never recovered from the severe
recession of 1974-75 and the increase in energy prices that occurred after
the 1973 oil crisis."'
The second factor that operates to reduce demand is price volatility.
The price of copper has seen dramatic plunges and spectacular gains.41
Based primarily on its daily trading price on the London Metal Ex-
change ("LME") 2  and New York Commodity Exchange
("COMEX"),43 the selling price of copper is historically volatile." As
Sir Ronald Prain said:
There are today few illusions about the harmful effects which fluctuating
prices can have on the copper industry: they can discourage investment in
exploration, the development of new mines and the advancement of tech-
nology; they can have an adverse effect on costs of production and they can
jeopardize the future of the market, despite the fact that copper is still an
incomparable metal with its almost unlimited range of uses.
4 ?
"The instability of copper prices has perhaps been the most important
factor influencing its substitution. Copper is an intermediate product,
and large users . . . . are concerned with the volatility of supply and
39 Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, at 1713. "Between 1977 and 1983, downsizing, material
substitution, and increased engine efficiency accounted for a loss of 15.8% of the copper consumed in
[the automobile manufacturing] industry .... 1985 MINERALS YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at 333.
Smaller cars use smaller engines that require smaller radiators, and thus less copper. In 1976, the
average car contained 32 pounds of copper, but by 1980, only 28 pounds were required. Unwrought
Copper, supra note 8, at 1713.
40 Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, at 1722.
41 See, e.g., G. ROBERTS, GUIDE TO WORLD COMMODITY MARKETS 71 (1985); NON-FERROUS
METALS DATA, supra note 28. See also Copper and Aluminum Join the Shake-Out, Fin. Times, Oct.
21, 1987, at 38, col. 1 ("Copper and aluminum are the most traded metals on the LME. They attract
the attention of fund managers and private investors, making them more vulnerable to the general
investment climate."). The recent spectacular changes in the price of copper is a prime example. In
February 1987, copper was selling for about 67¢ per pound. Chicago Trib., Feb. 18, 1987, § 3, at 12,
col. 6. Yet by November 1987, the price had risen to $1.07. Copper Rally Continues, supra note 34.
Likewise, predictions for the future of the price vary widely, see Id., causing "panic buying," which
drives up the price of copper. See Waves of Panic Buying Push Copper Prices Up, N.Y. Times, Nov.
11, 1987, at 40, col. 1 (nat'l ed.); see also Copper Producers Raise Their Prices, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11,
1987, at 28, col. 5 (natl ed.); Advance in Copper Prices Is Attributed To Rising Demand, Declining
Supply, Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1987, at 44, col. 4 (Midwest ed.).
42 See generally R. PRAIN, supra note 20, at 80-112.
43 See generally id. at 99. See also D. MEZGER, supra note 2, at 111-16.
44 R. MIKESELL, supra note 3, at 81-89; U.S. Assistance to Foreign Copper Producers, supra note
4, at 198. As a corollary, "[b]ecause of copper's extensive use in the construction, electrical, and
transport industries, the LME spot price... is one of the most sensitive indicators of world indus-
trial activity." IMF SURVEY, Feb 6, 1978, at 34.
45 R. PRAIN, supra note 20, at 109. See generally id. at 151-68.
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prices perhaps even more than with the price itself ... 46
The third factor is the elimination of certain existing private and
United States government markets for copper and the failure of new mar-
kets to materialize. Three government markets have been lost. First, in
1982 the industry saw its government market decrease by 79 million
pounds per year (representing 2% of the market in that year4 7) when the
United States reduced the copper content of the United States penny
from 95% to 2.4%. While a relatively slight decrease in aggregate, it
came at a time when demand had already been in significant decline.
Ironically, the change was implemented out of concern that the price of
copper, then between 84o and 86o per pound, would rise to over $1.12
per pound.49 Until the last quarter of 1987, the COMEX price remained
near 67¢ per pound, and has only recently (and probably only temporar-
ily) reached $1.07,50 still below forecasts.
The second lost government market is the United States strategic
materials stockpile. Although considered a strategic material under the
Strategic Materials Stockpile Act,5 no copper has been purchased for
this stockpile. In 1976, the Federal Preparedness Agency of the General
Services Administration announced a stockpile goal of 1,299,000 tons of
copper.52 At that time, only 20,261 tons were being held by the govern-
ment.53 In 1982, $85 million was appropriated for the purchase of cop-
per.54 Even so, by the end of 1983, the stockpile contained only 29,000
tons, less than 3% of the goal of one million tons as then set by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency.55 While several bills have
46 TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 21, at 25.
47 The Proposed Change in the Penny: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs and
Coinage of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 163
(1981)[hereinafter Penny Hearings].
48 Id. at 4. A new dollar coin, made primarily from copper, has been proposed. H.R. 3348,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1987); S. 1742, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1987).
49 Penny Hearings, supra note 47, at 3-4.
50 In February 1987, copper was selling for about 67¢r per pound. See supra note 41. Chicago
Trib., Feb. 18, 1987, § 3, at 12, col. 12. By October, the cash price had risen to about 94c, see
Chicago Trib., Oct. 21, 1987, § 3, at 15, col. 4, and the New York Commodity Exchange
("COMEX") futures price hovered near 73c. Id. Comparing futures prices from late 1987 demon-
strates that this sharp rise is recent and unexpected: futures prices set in late 1987 were near 63c. See
1986 COMEX STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 87 (1987).
The recent and spectacular increase in the price of copper to over $1.00 per pound is viewed as a
very temporary aberration, and its price is expected to drop to between 65e and 70t per pound in
1988. Copper Rally Continues, supra note 34.
51 50 U.S.C. § 98 (1982).
52 Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, app.
53 Id. See generally NoN-FERROUS METAL DATA, supra note 28, at 147-48.
54 Pub. L. No. 97-276, § 112, 96 Stat. 1192 (1982).
55 Fiscal Year 1985 Department of Energy Authorization (Nuclear Fission R & D and Waste
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since been introduced which would provide funds to purchase copper for
the stockpile,5 6 none has been approved and no copper has been
purchased. As of December 31, 1986, the United States stockpile con-
tained 22,000 tons of copper, approximately 2% of the stated goal.57
Finally, one potential new United States government market that
copper has probably lost involves the use of copper as a canister material
in the United States high-level nuclear waste storage program.58 While
no decision has yet been made as to the actual canister material, it is
more likely that steel will be used in the program, because the sites that
have been selected for the storage facility are far more appropriate for
steel than for copper canisters.59 Copper industry analysts had predicted
that if copper were used in this application, it would create a market for
perhaps as much as two million tons of copper;' in comparison, domes-
tic production in 1986 was 1,269,221 tons.61
At the same time that these three government markets have been
lost, certain private markets for copper have not developed as expected.
First, while it had been hoped that copper would find a new, substantial
market in OPEC-financed desalinization plants, those plants have not
been constructed, and are now at best a long-term opportunity. 62 Sec-
ond, the failure of solar energy to gain widespread acceptance also has
denied copper a new market as both a conductor of solar-generated elec-
tricity and as conduit for solar-heated hot water.63 It is too soon to esti-
mate what impact, if any, the advent of another technology,
superconductivity, will have on the market for copper, though a use for
Management): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy Research and Production of the House
Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong,, 2d Sess. 645 (1984)(statement of Rep. J. Me-
Nulty)[hereinafter DOE Oversight Hearings]. See generally NON-FERROUS METAL DATA, supra
note 28, at 148-49.
56 See, eg., S. 1544, supra note 2; H.R. 2412, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983).
57 NON-FERROUS METAL DATA, supra note 28, at 148.
58 See infra notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
59 The only site presently under consideration is the Yucca Mountain facility in Nevada. See
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203 (Dec. 22, 1987), tit. V, § 5011(a), reprinted
in 133 CONG. Rc. H12939, H13006 (1987). Research into crystalline rock as a potential storage
site was terminated by Congress, id. at § 1512, 133 CONG. REc. at H13700. Therefore, it is unlikely
that copper will be used as a canister material because crystalline rock is its best performance envi-
ronment. See DOE Oversight Hearings, supra note 55, at 57.
60 DOE Oversight Hearings, supra note 55, at 58.
61 NON-FERROUS METAL DATA, supra note 28, at 25.
62 TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 21, at 24. Such plants would require 90 tons of
copper per million gallons per day plant capacity. Id. See 1985 MINERALS YEARBOOK, supra note
23, at 333.
63 Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, app. See 1985 MINERALS YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at
333.
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copper may develop.' Third, demand for copper for electrical transmis-
sion development is below expectations. A significant use for copper is as
wire in electrical transmission equipment, such as high-tension power
lines and electrical generating equipment.65 Electrification and industri-
alization-projects undertaken by developing, not developed, nations-
account for a large share of world demand for copper. Developed coun-
tries by definition do not need large-scale electrification, and those devel-
oping countries in need of such projects, unable to afford them, have been
forced to cancel planned projects.66 Severe debt problems have discour-
aged these developing countries from undertaking large-scale electrifica-
tion or industrialization, resulting in a reduced demand for copper.67
The final factor decreasing demand for newly mined copper is the
growing market share of recycled copper.68 Copper, virtually indestruc-
tible, is never actually consumed. For example, when a building is de-
molished, the copper used in its construction (a major use of metal in
pre-twentieth century buildings) becomes available for recycling and can
re-enter the market as scrap. Substantial numbers of these buildings are
only now being demolished, and thus the market share of recycled cop-
per has only recently become significant.69 Thus, as a nation develops
and undertakes intensive industrialization and electrification, its demand
for copper is highest. As a nation matures, its infrastructure require-
ments level off and "its requirements for most raw materials per unit of
GNP .... tend[s] to decline. ' ' 70 That decrease is attributable both to a
lessened demand for new infrastructure and to the impact of scrap.
C. The United States Industry: A Smaller Piece of a Smaller Pie.
As a result of declining demand and increasing imports, the domes-
64 See 1985 MINERALS YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at 333.
65 See D. HARGREAVES, supra note 31, at 66.
66 Nonferrous Metals, supra note 8, at 20-4.
67 Id. See also R. BOWEN & A. GUNATILAKA, supra note 4, at 14 ("An important factor in the
third world is the snail-like pace of economic progress in South America, Africa and Asia coupled
with and, in part, caused by a very high rate of increase in population.").
68 See generally R. PRAIN, supra note 20, at 142-50; D. MEZGER, supra note 2, at 36-40.
69 Copper does not deteriorate. When a product is demolished or scrapped, the copper con-
tained therein may be recycled. "[Tihe average life of copper in service varies from three to five
years for transportation purposes to 40 years or more in power transmission lines and cable giving a
pattern to recycling trends."- D. HARGREAVES, supra note 31, at 68. "Peacetime recycling of scrap
copper did not become important in the United States until the early 1950's. It now accounts for
40% of apparent copper consumption." T. NAVIN, supra note 4, at 5. See also R. PRAiN, supra note
20, at 54-55. Besides reducing long-term demand, the durability of copper affects its pricing. See
generally Coase, Durability and Monopoly, 15 J.L. ECON. 143 (1972).
70 R. PRAIN, supra note 20, at 263, quoting Varon & Takeuchi, Developing Countries and Non-
fuel Minerals, 52 FOREIGN AFF. 497 (1974).
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tic copper industry has lost a large share of both the world and dometic
markets, perhaps permanently. Imports of refined copper which in 1982
were only about 10% of domestic consumption increased to 28% in
1985.71 In 1986 imports increased even further.72 Combined with a
sharp decrease in demand,73 the initial result was widespread and un-
precedented unemployment.74 Indeed, between 1982 and 1984, the
United States copper industry experienced the worst depression in its his-
tory. From 1981 to 1982, the price of copper fell to a point at or below
the cost of production, its lowest point in real terms this century.75 The
domestic industry's share of world production fell by 5%;76 mine and
smelter production fell by 28% and 29%, respectively;77 and the value of
the copper produced fell by more than 33%.78 Between 1981 and 1985,
71 "As a percentage of apparent consumption of refined copper, U.S. import reliance reached
28% in 1985; this compared with an import reliance of 1% as recently as 1982." 1985 MINERALS
YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at 336. See Use of IMFResources by Major Copper-Producing Countrier
Hearing on S. 2524 Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy of the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1984)[hereinafter Use of IMF Resources]. See also
Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, at 1712 ("In percentage terms, 1983 imports of blister copper and
refined copper exceed their 1979 levels by 88 percent and 125 percent, respectively." (footnotes omit-
ted)). "Imported refined copper reached a record of more than half a million metric tons in 1986.
This is an increase of 10 to 20 percent, compared to recent years." 133 CONG. Rc. S5239
(1987)(statement of Senator Domenici). "Refined copper imports which, as recently as 1979, were
only about 10% of domestic consumption, surged to 26% in 1983 and, according to Commerce
Department projections, will reach 35.5% in 1989." Hearings on Reauthorization of Superfund
Before Subcomm. on Water Resources of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1125 (1985)(footnote and emphasis omitted)[hereinafter Water Resources
Hearings].
72 See supra note 71.
73 Copper is used in "generators, motors, electric locomotives, switchboards and telephone and
telegraph equipment [and in] its alloyed form... building costruction... automobile manufactur-
ing, ammunition and shipbuilding industries." TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 21, at
20. See generally T. NAVIN, supra note 4, at 70-79. These are durable goods, and the decision to
purchase them easily may be postponed by the consumer. Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, at 1713.
Purchases of copper were postponed during the recession, when demand for these end-products
declined. See id. at 1723. Similarly, foreign demand for such goods decreased and demand for
copper by developing countries failed to meet expectations as those countries were forced to cancel
electrical and industrial development projects. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
74 US. Assistance to Foreign Copper Producers, supra note 4, at 28-30. Moreover, unemployment
increased in 1985, the industry employing some 25,000 fewer employees in 1985 than in 1980. NON-
FERROUS METALS, supra note 8, at 20-1. "Employment in the U.S. copper industry totalled an
estimated 9,800 in 1986, compared to more than 30,000 as recently as 1981, and 15,000 in 1984."
133 CONG. REc. S5240 (1987)(statement of C. Hansen, President, Ariz. Mining Ass'n).
75 Use ofIMFResources, supra note 71, at 43. See also [1984] 1 U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, MIN-
ERALS YEARBOOK, Metals and Minerals 291 (1985)[hereinafter 1984 MINERALS YEARBOOK].
76 1986 STATISTICAL ABsTRAcr, supra note 8, at 699.
77 Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, at 1712. See 1986 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 8, at
694.
78 1986 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 8, at 695.
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the five major domestic producers lost $3 billion.79
While the depression within the copper industry was in part merely
a symptom of the general recession affecting the United States and the
world economy, 0 its effects were felt more deeply and for a longer dura-
tion in the copper industry than in the general economy."1 Since many
copper mines and smelters are located near small communities, the im-
pact was especially focused. 2 Moreover, because demand has yet to
catch up with this tremendous surplus capacity, the recovery of the do-
mestic industry has lagged behind that of the general economy.83
"Although the U.S. demand for copper and copper products is regaining
strength, this demand is being satisfied, by and large, by imports." 4 Do-
mestic producers have shut down marginal mines and implemented cost-
saving measures, actions which lowered production costs by 25% be-
tween 1981 and 1985.85 Even so, the industry remains depressed, with
the price of copper remaining until very recently near domestic produc-
tion costs.8 6 Furthermore, half of domestic mine capacity is closed and
79 Water Resources Hearings, supra note 71, at 1124.
80 See generally ADJUSTMENT, CONDITIONALITY, AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCING 16-29 (J.
Muns ed. 1984).
81 See generally Water Resources Hearings, supra note 71, at 1124-25. "Domestic copper mine,
smelter, and refinery production all declined significantly between 1979 and 1983 .... Mine output
fell 27.6 percent from 1979 to 1983 while smelter production slid 29.3%. Refinery output followed a
similar trend dropping 21.3% between 1979 and 1983." Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, at 1712
(footnotes omitted). Production and capacity utilization similarly declined: "For mines, the decline
was from a 78.5 percent utilization rate in 1979 to 59.8% in 1983. For smelters, the drop was from
77.7% to 56.8%, and for refineries, the decrease was from 86.8% to 62.0%." Id. (footnotes
omitted).
82 The loss of two-thirds of the jobs in the industry has devastated "rural areas in the West
where the copper industry was the underpinning of the local economy." 133 CONG. Rac. S9378
(1987)(statement of Senator DeConcini). See, eg., U.S. Assistance to Foreign Copper Producers,
supra note 4, at 17-19 (statement of Jerry Brisbiescas, Mayor of Mammoth, Ariz.).
83 The price of copper is set on the world market. See infra notes 105-06. Thus, the economic
recovery of the United States did not bring about a worldwide copper recovery. See Unwrought
Copper, supra note 8, at 1722 n.47. Production of copper for 1984 was 1,203,000 short tons, just
59,000 more than in 1983, and except for that year, the lowest production rate since before 1970.
1986 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 8, at 711.
Recently, consumption has exceeded supply, driving up the price. See Copper Rally Continues,
supra note 34. However, this is viewed as a temporary situation because the extent of the tremen-
dous excess capacity is expected to more than compensate for this temporary tightness by the second
half of 1988, pushing prices backdown. Id
84 133 CONG. REC. S9378 (1987).
85 Id. See also 1985 MINERALS YEARBOOK supra note 23, at 321, 323.
86 COMEX prices in 1985 averaged 7% below 1982 prices, and 1982 was a year of deep reces-
sion. Consequently, production remains down, mines remain closed, and industry employment is
less than 50% of its 1980 peak. This despite substantial cost-cutting by the producers. NONFER-
ROUS METALS, supra note 8, at 20-1 to 20-4. See also 1985 MINERALS YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at
321, 325.
In cents per pound, average LME prices were: 67.192 (1982), 72.153 (1983), 62.562 (1984), and
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expected never to reopen.8 7 The long-term result of the 1982 depression
seems to be the permanent loss of much domestic production capacity.
Consequently, imports are expected to constitute more than 35% of do-
mestic consumption by 1990.88
D. Foreign State-owned Producers: Producing Without
Regard to Demand
Nearly 60% of the world's known copper reserves are located in
developing countries, and 40% are controlled by state-owned mining in-
terests, all of which belong to the Conseil Intergouvernemental des Pays
Exportateurs de Cuivre ("CIPEC"), the Intergovernmental Council of
Copper Exporting Countries.89 Formed in 1967 by Chile, Zambia, Peru,
and Zaire-countries then accounting for 40% of world copper produc-
tion 9 -- CIPEC originally sought to follow the market strategies of
OPEC,91 but its efforts had little effect.92 The strategy failed for two
reasons. First, the individual interests of CIPEC members proved too
divergent to permit agreement on production strategies.9 Second, and
more importantly, its members are critically dependent on copper for
foreign exchange, which severely restricts their abilities to curtail pro-
duction. 94 CIPEC now collects and disseminates information to assist
member nations in forecasting supply and demand and acts as a consulta-
64.904 (1985). NON-FERROUS METAL DATA, supra note 28, at 44. In 1986, LME prices dropped
from 64.344 in January to 60.580 by December. Id As noted supra note 41, the price has recently,
and apparently temporarily, increased to over $1.00 per pound.
87 NONFERROUS METALS, supra note 8, at 20-1 to 20-4.
88 See supra note 71. Domestic capacity has fallen by 33% since 1982. Copper Rally Continues,
supra note 34. In addition, world production capacity has fallen 1.5 million metric tons since 1982.
Id.
89 TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 21, at 10. The Intergovernmental Council of
Copper Exporting Countries ("CIPEC") is also known in Spanish as: Consejo Intergubernamental
de Paises Exportadores de Cobre. Use of IMF Resources, supra note 71, at 47.
90 TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 21, at 10. Indonesia, Australia, Papua New
Guinea, Yugoslavia, and Mauritania later joined CIPEC. W. GLUSHKE, J. SHAW & B. VARON,
COPPER: THE NEXT FIFTEEN YEARS 20 (1979).
91 In contrast to OPEC, which sought to raise prices in order to capture a larger market share,
CIPEC sought to depress prices by overproducing. Use oflMFResources, supra note 71, at 12. For
comparisons of OPEC and CIPEC, see R. PRAIN, supra note 20, at 255-60; D. MEZGER, supra note
2, at 116-19.
92 M. LASAGA, supra note 23, at 14-15. See eg., Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, at 1723 n.48.
See generally R_ PRAIN, supra note 20, at 248-55.
93 See W. PETERS, supra note 26, at 39.
94 D. HARGREAVES, supra note 31, at 68. "In the CIPEC countries the national economy is
almost entirely dependent on a continuing flow of foreign exchange. This is the whole basis of these
countries' existence." R. PRAIN, supra note 20, at 257. See infra notes 98-100 and accompanying
text.
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tive body to coordinate policies.9
5
The most important development in the world copper market has
been the recent nationalizations of the copper facilities of Chile, Peru,
Zaire, and Zambia.16
At the beginning of the [1960s] copper production in which government
held any sort of interest did not amount to more than 2 1/2 per cent of
capacity .... By 1970 this total had risen to some ... 43 per cent of
capacity. More than a quarter of the world's copper was being produced by
mines totally owned by government, 12 per cent by companies in which the
state had a majority interest, and 5 per cent by companies in which govern-
ment had minority interests.
97
Today, the primary competitors of the United States domestic industry
are these foreign, state-owned producers. Copper exports are extremely'
vital to these countries, accounting for 48% of the 1983 export earnings
of Chile, 41% of the 1982 export earnings of Zaire, 89% of the 1982
export earnings of Zambia,98 and 50% of the 1985 export earnings of
Peru. 9 9
That the primary competitors of the domestic industry are nations,
and not private ventures, is key to understanding the problems con-
fronting the domestic industry. The priorities of these state-owned pro-
ducers are directed more toward increasing the technical skill of their
citizens, creating full employment, and generating maximum amounts of
foreign exchange than toward generating profit." For instance, between
95 Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, app. See generally C. MPHAISHA, supra note 26, at 108-37.
96 See generally R. PRAIN, supra note 20, at 223-27; D. MEZGER, supra note 2, at 146-57.
97 R. PRAIN, supra note 20, at 222-23.
98 Use of IMF Resources, supra note 71, at 45. In 1985 in Chile, "[c]opper alone accounted for
... about 46% of export earnings. About 77,000 workers were directly employed in the mining
sector. Copper production and export is the most important economic activity .. " Velasco, supra
note 23, at 195. "As the major export [of Zambia], copper provides most of the necessary foreign
exchange. The copper industry has spurred the growth of other industries that provide services and
input to it." C. OBIDEGWU & M. NZIRAMASANGA, supra note 26, at 20. Zairian exports in 1984
totalled $1.6 billion, of which $544.4 million was earned from copper.
99 1985 MINERALS YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at 346.
100 Use of IMF Resources, supra note 71, at 48. The strategy of these state-owned producers,
which subsidize copper production both directly and indirectly, see, e.g., 133 CONG. REC. S9378
(1987)(Chile), "is to gain and hold on to market share, regardless of the costs involved. Profits are
unimportant in this strategy since many of the firms are accountable only to the Government, not
profit-motivated shareholders." 133 CONG. REC. S9368 (1987). For example, Zambian
"[g]overnment taxation policies are aimed at maximizing government revenues from mining while
providing the industry with incentives to expand production and employment of Zambians .... The
mining companies provide training programs for Zambian employees. In addition, they sponsor
employees or prospective employees in technical colleges and universities .... A major concern is
upgrading the training and skills of the labor force, since the availability of skilled labor is a con-
straint on the growth of the economy." C. OBIDEGWU & M. NZIRAMASANGA, supra note 26, at 18-
19. Indeed, "[t]he copper industry employs over 14 percent of the total Zambian wage factor." Id. at
700
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1981 and 1983, when copper prices were below production costs for all
producers except Chile, domestic producers followed the dictates of sup-
ply and demand and reduced production; Chile, Peru, Zambia, and
Zaire increased production.1"1 Nations, unlike private entities, are not
bound by private capital markets, nor by the demands of shareholders,
nor by the unavoidable need for profit. This freedom gives foreign pro-
ducers a distinct advantage. Even so, this Comment will show that
United States policy has operated to further disadvantage domestic pro-
ducers relative to their foreign state-owned competitors.
III. THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
A. Domestic Copper Competition with Foreign Copper on a Uniform
World Market
Prior to 1978, the major United States producers offered their prod-
uct to customers on the basis of published price lists1°2 and set the do-
mestic price of copper near the world price-at a profitable point, but
low enough to prevent substitution. 1 3 However, in the late 1970s copper
imports at a lower price increased, and "both a new lack of control by
domestic producers over import levels and the worldwide nature of the
copper market" forced domestic producers to base their prices directly
on the London Metals Exchange ("LME") and the New York Commod-
ity Exchange ("COMEX")." Since then,
All... copper [produced in the free world] competes in the world markets,
25. See also W. PETERS, supra note 26, at 36 (issues of renegotiation of Zambian takeover included
localization of labor).
As Senator Domenici said:
The overwhelming production of copper is governmentally owned. Governments subsidize and
governments own that production. They do not care about the marketplace concept. It is a
social policy to subsidize and grow and employ, thus dropping the price of these commodities
not to marketplace levels, but rather to the subsidized levels that come from their insistence on
increasing capacity in a subsidized manner for products which are already in a world glut
posture.
133 CONG. REc. S9374 (1987).
101 Use of IMF Resources, supra note 71, at 48. Expansions have continued despite the persis-
tence of depressed prices. Zaire, which produced at nearly full capacity in 1985, planned for a 55%
increase in production for 1986. 1985 MINERALS YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at 971. Chile increased
its 1985 production by 5% over 1984, and planned for additional increases in 1986. Id. at 341-43.
Peru increased its 1985 copper exports by approximately 20% in 1984. Id. at 346-47.
Not surprisingly, when prices remained depressed, eventually these countries reduced produc-
tion, thus restricting supply and increasing price. Soon that production capacity will once again be
utilized, and the price will once again fall to prior levels, reflecting the availability of oversupply. See
generally Copper Rally Continues, supra note 34.
102 G. ROBERTS, supra note 41, at 64.
103 Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, at 1722 n.42. For a discussion of pricing practices prior to
1978, see R. PRAIN, supra note 20, at 94-99.
104 Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, at 1722 n.42. See also G. ROBERTS, supra note 41, at 64-65.
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directly or indirectly. Copper can be freely shipped anywhere in the world
for a few cents per pound and... those prices must reflect.., the prices set
by transactions in . . . the London Metal Exchange and the New York
Commodity Exchange. 105
Copper has a peculiar status as a fungible world commodity: it is traded
at a relatively uniform international price in an open global commodity
market.l0 6 Consequently, even though the United States is virtually self-
sufficient in copper, domestic prices reflect world production, sales, and
demand. Thus, the price for domestically produced copper is set by the
world market, not by domestic producers. The domestic producers are
unable to increase prices to cover, for example, increased costs due to
United-States environmental regulations. 7 Domestic producers must
follow the world copper price, so that lower price imports do not take an
even larger share of the domestic market. They are price takers, not
price makers.
B. Foreign State-Owned Producers' Advantages
Over Domestic Producers
Foreign state-owned producers are better able to compete on the
world copper market than are United States domestic producers for a
variety of reasons. Foremost are two practical business advantages of
foreign producers. First, foreign producers' labor costs represent a
smaller share of their production costs than in domestically produced
copper. 10 8 Second, the ore content of foreign mines is generally higher
than that of domestic mines, a fact greatly reducing costs for production
of foreign producers.109
105 U.S. Assistance to Foreign Copper Producers, supra note 4, at 198.
106 Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, at 1711.
107 See generally infra notes 147-61 and accompanying text.
108 U.S. Assistance to Foreign Copper Producers, supra note 4, at 199. See also Unwrought Cop-
per, supra note 8, at 1721 (wage costs per worker increased by 9.5% per year from 1979 to 1983, but
total labor expenditures declined by 33% from 1981 to 1983 because the number of workers em-
ployed decreased).
109 U.S. Assistance to Foreign Copper Producers, supra note 4, at 221 (statement of Michael Rie-
ber, Professor of Mineral Economics, University of Arizona); M. LASAGA, supra note 23, at 11
("The high grade of proven reserves explains why Chilean mines operate under one of the lowest
operating costs in the world.").
Since the average grade of U.S. copper ore is 35 percent below the average grade in foreign
countries, U.S. copper mines, to yield the same quantity of copper, must mill and concentrate
more than half as much ore as their foreign competitors. Relative costs for U.S. producers will
continue to increase over the coming decades ....
Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, at 1720 (footnotes omitted). "U.S: milling costs are 55 percent
above the average of foreign countries, and almost all of this difference is attributable to the lower
grade-of domestic ores." Id. at 1720 n.21.
The low ore content of United States copper is clearly a substantial reason why domestic copper
is more expensive to produce. In 1985, production costs per pound were: Zaire, 57r; Chile, 60c;
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"In addition to the marketplace factors... another important factor
has been Government subsidies to build excess capacity. With the in-
creasing involvement of governments... there is a growing tendency to
ignore commercial considerations in key business decisions, including de-
cisions to expand capacity." 110 Governments compete with the United
States copper industry. These governments leave "to the private sector
alone the task of curtailing production in an attempt to match reduced
demand .... This practice [of overproduction] continues because many
of these same foreign industries are receiving direct monetary subsidies
from their governments." '' Thus, even when the price of copper falls
below the production cost of a foreign mine, a subsidy may enable that
mine to continue production when a domestic, private mine could not.'" 2
In addition to these three factors, which the United States is unable
to affect directly,"' there are several other advantages of foreign produ-
cers which are not the result of practical differences between domestic
and foreign mines. These factors relate to United States policies that
either confer advantages upon foreign producers or impose disadvantages
upon domestic producers that affect the price of production, and hence
the ability of domestic producers to compete in the world copper market.
L United States Foreign Policies Affecting Competitiveness in the
Domestic Copper Industry
Because copper is a globally traded commodity, United States for-
eign policy affects the ability of the domestic industry to compete. Par-
ticularly, two interrelated practices have given distinct advantages to
Zambia, 60T; United States, 70o; Peru, 81c. See 1985 MINERALS YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at 351.
However, that is not the same as saying that domestic producers are not competitive. Indeed, taking
into account that United States labor costs are higher, and that compliance with United States envi-
ronmental regulations add 10q to 15% per pound to the price of domestically produced copper, see
infra note 149, domestic producers are actually quite competitive. Indeed, the United States has
lower mining costs than all but Peru, and smelting costs lower than both Peru and Zaire. See 1985
MINERALS YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at 351. It is in the milling stage, when greater amounts of
waste must be removed by domestic producers to yield the same amount of ore that domestic costs
exceed foreign costs by 55%. See Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, at 1720 n.21.
110 133 CONG. REC. S9368 (1987)(statement of Senator Domenici).
111 Id. at S9377 (1987)(statement of Senator Domenici).
112 For example, Chile maintained a price of 75r per pound for copper when its selling price on
the world market was 59r. Id at S9378.
113 That is, the United States cannot easily enhance the ore content of its mines, nor reduce the
wages of its work force, nor prohibit a foreign government from subsidizing production. That is not
to say that the United States government cannot affect the efficiency and productivity of its mines
and work force. "The domestic industry has already demonstrated that through improved technol-
ogy domestic producers have improved their production efficiencies and reduced the cost per pound
of production." Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, at 1714 (footnotes omitted). See also infra notes
243-45 and accompanying text.
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foreign producers: 1) participation by the United States in institutions
that grant low-interest loans to foreign producers; and 2) the practice of
conditioning such loans on the ability of the borrower to increase
production.
First, the participation by the United States in lending institutions
which provide assistance to foreign copper-producing nations has en-
hanced the competitive position of these nations relative to that of the
United States. While mines in the United States were developed with
private domestic capital, most foreign mines were developed with capital
foreign to the producer-state--capital which was private as well as orga-
nizational and governmental in source.' 1 4 The United States has pro-
vided financial assistance through participation in a variety of
institutions, including the various MDBs and the CFF of the IMF. 1 5
Assistance by the IMF and MDBs has been substantial: between 1975
and 1983, loans on favorable terms totalling nearly $4.4 billion were
made to Chile, Peru, Zaire, and Zambia.' 16 In contrast, the United
States domestic industry spent $1.3 billion on modernization between
114 Private ventures provided the majority of the developmental capital in the early twentieth
century, particularly that used in developing mines in countries which were currently or formerly
colonies of the investor's home country. "It is to belabour the obvious... that Zambia's copper
industry was developed by foreign capital. The dominant firms were the British South Africa Com-
pany, the Roan Selection Trust, and the Anglo-American Corporation." C. MPHAISHA, supra note
26, at 62. Chile's mines were developed with assistance of British and German capital. T. NAVIN,
supra note 4, at 10. See also T. MORAN, supra note 1, at 119-52. See generally TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS, supra note 21, at 55-59; S. CUNNINGHAM, THE COPPER INDUSTRY IN ZAMBIA 63-
85 (1981).
Organizational assistance seemingly began in 1957, when the United Nations began to provide
low interest loans to assist copper production. TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 21, at
69-70.
115 See generally Use of IMF Resources, supra note 71; U.S. Assistance to Foreign Copper Produ-
cers, supra note 4.
116 Use of IMF Resources, supra note 71, at 9. For example, in 1983 the International Finance
Corporation participated in a $60 million expansion of a Chilean copper mine. Id. at 14. Also, the
Inter-American Development Bank approved a $268 million concessionary loan to Chile's Codelco
as part of a $670 million modernization and expansion plan. Id. Loans of $75 million and $27
million were also recently made from the World Bank and African Development Bank to Zambia.
Id. at 15. Between 1984 and April 1986, the CFF provided an additional $404 million to these
countries. Multilateral Development Banks, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Develop-
ment Institutions and Finance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 100th
Cong. 1st Sess. 411 (1987)[hereinafter Multilateral Development Banks]. In 1985, Peru obtained
$100 million in MDB financing to expand its mining facilities. 1985 MINERALS YEARBOOK, supra
note 23, at 347.
In addition, in 1983 the International Finance Corporation ("IFC") was considering participa-
tion in a $450 million loan package to expand Mexico's Canana mining and smelting facility, a loan
the IFC eventually decided against. Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 384-85 (1983)[hereinafter
Geopolitics Hearings].
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1979 and 1984.117 Moreover, funds were available to domestic producers
only at market rates, not at the favorable terms offered by the MDBs.118
Assistance by the CFF differed in form, though not effect, from that
given by the MDBs. The MDBs made loans at favorable and sometimes
concessionary terms for specific projects. The CFF, in contrast, provided
general balance of payment support rather than funding for specific
projects.119 Although there are distinctions between a loan granted by an
MDB for a specific project and balance of payment assistance from the
CFF, the effect of either type of assistance is similar to the fungibility of
capital. In either form, capital which is made available to the producer-
nation can be used to expand its production facilities either directly (as in
the case of MDB loans) or indirectly (as in the case of CFF assist-
ance).1 20 For the purposes of this analysis, no distinction will be drawn
between the two.
A primary purpose of the CFF is to make assistance available to
nations experiencing an export earnings shortfall due to declining world
prices in a particular commodity. 12 1 Thus, when the price of copper de-
clined in the early 1980s, the CFF granted balance of payment loans to
producers. These countries then continued to produce at levels in excess
of demand, reducing the price of copper even further, thereby qualifying
for further CFF assistance. 122 In effect, the CFF subsidized overproduc-
tion by foreign copper producers, overproduction which itself operated
to further depress the price of copper.1 23
Assistance by the MDBs consisted of loans for specific projects that
increased the production capacity of foreign producers. Between 1975
and 1983 the MDBs provided more than $1.8 billion to CIPEC produ-
117 Use of IMF Resources, supra note 71, at 9.
118 Id.
119 See Multilateral Development Banks, supra note 116, at 406-15; Gold, The Relationship Be-
tween the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 499 (1982);
Silard, The Role of the International Monetary Fund, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 90 (1982); Use of IMF
Resources, supra note 71, at 23.
120 See U.S. Assistance to Foreign Copper Producers, supranote 4, at 258 ("Any loan, for any
purpose, makes the transfer [to investments intended to increase copper production] possi-
ble.")(statement of Michael Rieber, Professor of Mineral Economics, University of Arizona).
121 See Finger & Derosa, The Compensatory Finance Facility and Export Instability, 14 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 14 (1980). See generally R. GOODE, ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES THROUGH THE IMF 6-7 (1985).
122 Use of IMFResources, supra note 71, at 20-21. In 1985 Chile received $73.1 million in CFF
financing to make up for loss of export earnings. 1985 MINERALS YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at 341.
"Unfortunately, the more Chile produced the lower copper prices fell." 133 CONG. REC. S9271
(1987).
123 Use of IMF Resources, supra note 71, at 20-21.
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cers at concessionary terms. 2 4 In 1984, $268 million was made available
to Chile to expand capacity and enhance efficiency,12 5 and $300 million
was made available to Zambia for rehabilitation of its copper industry. 2 6
In 1986, Chile and Zaire received loans totalling $130 million and $72.6
million, respectively, for copper production purposes. 12 7  Thus, the
MDBs lent at favorable terms for projects to increase the production and
enhance the efficiency of foreign state-owned mines even during the early
1980s when oversupply and depressed prices existed; at a time when
United States producers were curtailing production due to these poor
conditions.
Prior to 1981, the United States did not oppose on policy grounds
IMF or MDB assistance to nations overproducing copper. 128 Even since
1981, because loans are made by majority vote of members of the MDB,
opposition of the United States does not ipso facto defeat a proposed
loan."9 Indeed, opposition by the United States since 1981 has not pre-
vented the making of a single loan, and five loans totalling over $600
million have been approved for Chile, Zaire, and Zambia despite opposi-
tion by the United States.13 ° Thus, foreign copper producers received
and continue to receive favorable loans to modernize and expand.131 The
obvious advantage conferred by these loans is access to comparatively
inexpensive capital.
Second, CFF conditionality requiring that the borrowing state in-
crease production in order to obtain CFF assistance has permitted for-
eign copper producers to expand production even during times of
depressed prices and oversupply. In effect, the CFF encourages foreign
producers to increase production without regard to profit. 132 "It is clear
124 Id. at 45.
125 Id.
126 Id. See also 1984 MINERALS YEARBOOK, supra note 75, at 315.
127 133 CONG. REC. S9283 (1987).
128 Apparently, it was not recognized as a problem until, beginning in 1978, Congress directed
that for one year United States representatives to the various MDBs oppose any loans for the pro-
duction of any commodity in surplus on the world market if the loan would cause substantial injury
to a domestic producer. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1979, Pub.
L. No. 95-481, tit. VI, § 609, 92 Stat. 1601 (Oct. 18, 1978). Similar provisions specific to mining and
smelting, 22 U.S.C. 262k(c)(Supp. III 1985), and even to copper itself, Supplemental Appropriations
Act, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-88, tit. I, § 501, 99 Stat. 329-30 (Aug. 15, 1985), were enacted. See text
following 22 U.S.C. 262k(d)(Supp. III 1985). See also S. 2815, supra note 2; S. Rep. No. 440, supra
note 2.
129 See, e.g., Use of IMF Resources, supra note 71, at 36 ($268 million loan to Chile approved with
only the United States voting against the loan). See generally 133 CONG. REC. S9281-84 (1987).
130 133 CONG. REC. S9283 (1987).
131 See generally U.S. Assistance to Foreign Copper Producers, supra note 4; Use of lMFResources,
supra note 71, at 45.
132 Use of IMF Resources, supra note 71, at 41. See also U.S. Assistance to Foreign Copper Produ-
United States Copper Industry
8:686(1988)
that IMF conditionality... has often caused countries to maximize cop-
per production and exports irrespective of the impact on other copper
producers . ,, . 3 By requiring increased production despite prices be-
low cost, the CFF encouraged foreign producers to subordinate market
principles to increase production in order to meet debt service require-
ments and the CFF loan condition.
These two policies, granting favorable loans and providing assist-
ance through CFF conditionality, combined to enhance the ability of
state-owned producers (already motivated primarily by factors other
than profit) to externalize overproduction. Capital from the MDBs and
CFF was available to increase production, CFF assistance was available
to meet debt service shortfalls caused by the depressed prices which re-
sulted from that very same increased production.134 The CFF condition
effectively required overproduction.
Without external aid, these countries and their socialized mines could not
over the longer term continue overproducing during periods of such low
prices. But they can disregard their losses, in large measure, because the
IMF steps in and provides credits to keep these states-and their mines-
operating. It is most difficult for any private industry to operate against
state-owned enterprise, but the task facing the domestic copper industry
becomes close to impossible when its foreign competition is virtually freed
from the consequences of its uneconomic behavior by funds which are sup-
plied in significant part by our own government. 135
Because the price for copper is set on a worldwide basis, state-owned
producers were able to shift the effects of their overproduction onto
United States producers, thus forcing these domestic producers to curtail
production to compensate for foreign overproduction. 136  Indeed, be-
tween 1981 and 1983, while "western world copper production (exclud-
cers, supra note 4, at 204-05. This condition is intended to encourage the developing nation to
increase its earnings from exports of copper, thereby lessening its balance of payments problems. Id
at 41. See also Pirzio-Biroli, Making Sense of the IMF Conditionality Debate, 17 J. WORLD TRADE
L. 115, 128 (1982)(Critics argue that CFF funding encourages recipient nations "to move towards
payments balance through export expansion rather than import contraction, a policy more appropri-
ate to their needs.").
133 Use of IMF Resources, supra note 71, at 44.
134 Overproduction increases supply, thus lowering the price. Domestic producers, bound by the
need for profit, could not produce copper when its price fell below the cost of production. Yet,
foreign producers produced copper in increased amounts for extended periods of time when the price
was below the cost of production. Domestic producers were not able to borrow capital on terms as
favorable as foreign producers, nor were they able to obtain CFF assistance, and as a result of this
overproduction, domestic producers were forced to layoff workers and close mines. See Water Re-
sources Hearings, supra note 71, at 1124-30. Thus, foreign producers externalized the effects of their
overproduction (namely, unemployment) onto domestic producers.
135 Geopolitics Hearings, supra note 116, at 488.
136 "Imports are the vehicle transmitting this depressed world price into the U.S. market, requir-
ing producers to peg their prices to the world price." Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, at 1715.
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ing the CIPEC nations) decreased by 17.7 percent,... mine output from
the CIPEC countries increased by 9.8 percent and Chile's output [in-
creased] by 16.3 percent."' 137
A factor further encouraging overproduction by foreign state-owned
producers is that Chile, Peru, Zaire, and Zambia have enormous foreign
debt service requirements. 138 Thus, debt service requirements motivated
these borrowing producers to increase production in order to acquire the
foreign currency necessary to service those debts. 139 CFF conditionality
and the availability of MDB loans, particularly in light of these debt ser-
vice requirements, encouraged foreign state-owned producers to pursue
policies designed to acquire as much foreign currency as possible by pro-
ducing as much copper as possible.
Overproduction led to the predictable consequence of a worldwide
copper glut, further depressing its price.""4 Demand has only recently
caught up with supply, and until very recently the price of copper re-
mained below production cost for all but three or four of the world's
copper mines. 141 "In the absence of a significant and sustained increase
in prices, total domestic production could fall about 17 percent ... by
1990.
"1142
137 Use of IMF Resources, supra note 71, at 48. While the foreign producer arguably could have
over-produced without such loans, inarguably their ability to do so was enhanced by the availability
of the IMF and MDB capital. See id, at 20-21.
138 See generally S. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 114, at 309; D. MEZGER, supra note 2, at 218-35.
For example, the annual export earnings of Chile's state-owned copper interest, Codelco, roughly
equal the interest Chile pays annually on its national debt. Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, app.
"Copper accounts for about two-thirds of Chilean exports ...." M. LASAGA, supra note 23, at 1.
"The most pronounced direct impact on the Chilean economy from the copper sector is through the
balance of payments." Id. at 11. See generally Third World Debt: Hearings on H.R. 3 Before the
Subcomm. on International Development Institutions and Finance of the House Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. 1-145 (1987)[hereinafter Third World Debt]. Fur-
thermore, "Zaire's debt is so large that it is not expected to be able to service its debt without
substantial relief before 1990 at the earliest." African Debt Crisis. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
African Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 29 (1985). See
generally Third World Debt, supra, at 147-244. "Zambia is critically dependent on copper for its
livelihood. Copper provides over 90 percent of its export revenue." Unwrought Copper, supra note
8, app. As of 1974, the Zambian copper industry provided "94 percent of gross domestic exports, 32
percent of gross domestic product, 53 percent of total government revenue, and 15 percent of paid
employment." S. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 114, at 16 (footnote omitted). In total, "[O]ver one-half
of the total export earnings of Chile.... Zaire, and Zambia come from copper .... [C]utbacks in
production would result in sharply higher unemployment in these countries." Unwrought Copper,
supra note 8, app.
139 See generally supra notes 94, 98-100 and accompanying text.
140 DOE Oversight Hearings, supra note 55, at 57.
141 Use of IMF Resources, supra note 71, at 43. See also supra note 50.
142 Nonferrous Metals, supra note 8, at 20-4 (emphasis added). Though significant, the present
increase in price is not expected to be sustained. See supra note 41.
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2. United States Domestic Policy Decisions Which Affect the Domestic
Copper Industry's Production Costs
Smelting copper produces significant amounts of sulfur dioxide, a
pollutant which has been causally linked to acid rain.143 Environmental
regulations promulgated by the United States Environmental Protection
Agency pursuant to the Clean Air Act require copper smelters to limit
emissions of sulfur dioxide."4 In order to comply with this law, copper
producers have added expensive pollution control systems to their smelt-
ers in order to remove sulfur dioxide.145 These systems have created ad-
ditional costs, because two tons of sulfuric acid are removed for each ton
of copper produced.146 The acid, a virtually worthless byproduct,147
must often be stored by the producer in large underground tanks, further
compounding environmental-rule compliance costs. 148
Environmental regulations add as much as 16% to domestic pro-
duction costs. 14 9  Beginning several years prior to the 1982-84 depres-
143 See generally U.S. Assistance to Foreign Copper Producers, supra note 4, at 98-184. But see
Acid Disposition Control Act of 1986 (Part 3): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and the
Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 865-950
(1986)[hereinafter Acid Control Hearing].
144 40 C.F.R. § 50.4 (1986). See generally T. NAvIN, supra note 4, at 97-109.
145 See generally Acid Control Hearing, supra note 143, at 868-70, 880; Unwrought Copper, supra
note 8, app.; Rothenberg, The Impact of Regulation on an Exhaustive Resource Industry: A Method-
ological Approach and a Model, 43 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. No. 1, 112, 143 (1979)("air quality
regulations have had the most serious regulatory impact on the copper industry." (footnote
omitted)).
146 US. Assistance to Foreign Copper Producers, supra note 4, at 247.
147 In 1985, emission abatement equipment captured 1,106,509 short tons of sulfuric acid which
was valued at a mere $11,526. U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, [1985] 2 MINERALS YEARBOOK 75 (1987).
Nationwide, some 2,230,257 metric tons of sulfuric acid were generated as byproduct from copper
smelting. 1985 MINERALS YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at 359.
[T]he capture of SO 2 from gases is an expensive and vexing nuisance, but a mandated necessity
for air quality .... [Alcid plants that operate on smelter gases, are capital intensive, tempera-
mental of operation, and yield a low-value product sensitive to the cost of transportation. In
fact, the delivered cost of acid may drive the selling expense well beyond the local market price.
Marketing Cogenerated Smelter Acid, 187 ENG. & MINING J., No. 5, at 31 (1985).
148 See generally US. Assistance to Foreign Copper Producers, supra note 4, at 42-43. "The isola-
tion of western U.S. copper producers from the industrial markets in the East and the availability of
low-cost Frasch sulfur made SO2 [sulfur dioxide] recovery uneconomic in the United States, except
in special cases." R. MIKESELL, supra note 3, at 67-68.
149 Compliance with environmental regulations added between 10( and 150 per pound to the
price of domestically produced copper, see U.S. Assistance to Foreign Copper Producers, supra note 4,
at 199, which averaged 76.5T per pound in 1983. 1986 STATISTICAL AnSrAcT, supra note 8, at
481. In 1983, regulatory expenditures amounted to 46.2% of all capital expenditures made by the
copper industry. Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, at 1721 n.27. The impact of environmental
regulations on the competitiveness of the domestic copper industry in the world market cannot be
exaggerated.
[C]opper industry capital expenditures on pollution control represented about 41 percent of the
industry's total capital expenditures between 1973 and 1977. This compares with the 5-percent
709
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sion, domestic producers were forced to divert capital from investments
designed to improve productivity and competitiveness to nonproductive
investments for pollution control devices.15° This compliance with envi-
ronmental regulations increased the production cost of domestic produ-
cers relative to their foreign competitors-a cost which they were unable
to pass on to the copper consumer due to the uniform world price of
copper-thereby reducing their ability to compete on the world market.
The tremendous compliance costs of these environmental regula-
tions has forced the closing of many domestic smelting facilities, includ-
ing the Phelps Dodge smelter at Douglas, Arizona, a small town in
southeastern Arizona near the Mexican border. 151 The Douglas smelter
is a prime example of the externality 52 created by the simple fact that
United States environmental laws apply only to domestic producers. In
average for all U.S. industries . . . . [Tihe largest regulatory costs . . are those related to
improving air quality through the recovery of sulfur dioxide exhaust gases .... [These costs]
cannot be passed forward to the consumer because the domestic price of copper closely follows
the world copper price quoted on the London Metal Exchange. Therefore, the increased costs
must be passed back to the mine ... reducing the competitiveness of domestic copper.
U.S. Assistance to Foreign Copper Producers, supra note 4, at 41.
In absolute terms, domestic copper producers have spent more than $2 billion to comply with
environmental regulations. See U.S. Assistance to Foreign Copper Producers, supra note 4, at 41. For
a comparison of the pollution control as a percentage of capital spending, see Acid Control Hearing,
supra note 143, at 880.
150 "Expenditures for environmental, safety, and health considerations have grown from 17 per-
cent of all copper expenditures at FYE 1979 to 46 percent by FYE 1983." Unwrought Copper,
supra note 8, app. In turn,
the proportion of mining and milling expenditures declined from 61.9 percent in 1979 to 51.2
percent in 1983, and such expenditures decreased by 18 percent in absolute terms. During the
same period, smelting expenditures increased by 87 percent in absolute terms and by 1983 rep-
resented a 42-percent share of total capital expenditures by copper producers. Expenditures on
copper-refining facilitates decreased by 56.8 percent from 1979 to 1983 in absolute terms and as
a share of total copper expenditures declined from 16.0 percent of the total to 6.9 percent.
Id.
Another factor affecting the ability of U.S. producers to supply the market is the condition
of smelting facilities. Although some U.S. producers have invested in the more modern flash
furnaces, a number of firms still utilize older, less efficient, reverberatory furnaces. This results
not only in efficiency losses, but also in increased costs to bring these furnaces into compliance
with environmental regulations.
d With higher prices, and thus more capital, these investments could be made. See infra notes
243-45 and accompanying text.
151 See, e.g., 1985 MINERALS YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at 321-26; Phelps Dodge Morenci
Smelter Closes, High Costs of Pollution Controls Cited, 15 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1447 (Jan. 4, 1985);
Miller v. Donovan, 620 F. Supp 712, 718 (U.S. Ct. Int'l Trade 1985)(environmental compliance
costs primary cause of closing of refinery and smelter). See Notice, Lodging of Consent Decree Pursu-
ant to Clean Air Act; Phelps Dodge Corp., 51 Fed. Reg. 28,634 (1986)(Douglas smelter closing).
152 An externality is a cost that "profit-maximizing behavior involuntarily imposes on others ....
Examples are tobacco smoking and air pollution. The... firm that imposes these costs does not take
them into account when deciding how much to... produce." R. COOTER, LAW & ECONOMICS 47
(1988). "[IThe externality-generating producer produces too much output and the associated harm
because there is a difference between private marginal cost and social marginal cost." Id. at 46.
Applying this, the fact that the Clear Air Act applied only to domestic smelters enabled Mexican
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light of the depressed selling price of copper, Phelps Dodge deemed it
uneconomical to equip the Douglas smelter with pollution control de-
vices efficient enough to bring the smelter into compliance with United
States law. 53 At the same time, Mexico planned to expand its smelters
at Cananea and Nacozari. These Mexican smelters did not have pollu-
tion control systems, were much larger than the Douglas smelter, and
were located just a few miles south of and just across the border from
Douglas.154 Without pollution abatement, not only would the Mexican
smelters emit more sulfur dioxide than had the Douglas smelter, but they
would emit more than all smelters in Arizona combined.15
5
Fortunately, the United States and Mexico have agreed that by June
1988 the Nacozari smelter and any new border smelter facilities must
meet United States emissions standards.' 56  However, unless and until
such standards are met, Mexico will externalize the cost of not equipping
its smelters with pollution control systems onto the United States. Mex-
ico is able to export more copper, made cheaper by the lack of those
systems.'5 7 Also, Mexico will be literally externalizing pollution costs
for this cheaper production because emissions from the Cananea and
Nacozari smelters flow north into the United States.158 The agreement
with Mexico forces it to internalize those costs only with respect to Cana-
smelters to operate at a lower private cost, externalizing actual pollution and lower smelter employ-
ment onto the United States.
153 U.S. Assistance to Foreign Copper Producers, supra note 4, at 37.
154 See 1985 MINERALS YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at 345-46. Ironically, the expansion was
planned to be financed in part by an MDB. See supra note 116.
155 See US. Assistance to Foreign Copper Producers, supra note 4, at 89 (article by Congressman
McNulty). In effect, the United States used imposition of the Clean Air Act on the Douglas facility
as a bargaining chip to extract a "firm commitment" that the Nacozari and Cananea smelters be
equipped with pollution control devices. U.S., Mexico Reach Agreement on Smelters, Sewage Treat-
ment Facility in Tiuana Area, 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 512 (July 26, 1985); Governors Urge Mexican
Smelter Controls, Call on EPA to Control Phelps Dodge Facility, 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 356 (July 5,
1985). Recently, the United States and Mexico agreed to emissions limitations on border copper
smelters. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
156 Copper Smelters Transboundary Air Pollution Agreement, Jan. 29, 1987, reprinted in 26
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 33 (1987)[hereinafter Smelter Treaty]. The Smelter Treaty ultimately
requires the Nacozari smelter and any new facility to meet the requirements of the Clean Air Act.
Compare 40 C.F.R. § 60.163 with Smelter Treaty, supra, art. I, §§ 3-4. However, only expansions of
Cananea are required to meet the standards. Smelter Treaty, supra, art. I, § 4.
Even though copper smelted at Cananea and Nacozari will soon be required to meet the same
standards as domestically produced copper, the Smelter Treaty is obviously an incomplete solution:
its purpose and effect go more toward preventing transboundary air pollution than toward equalizing
environmental costs of production. More importantly, the transaction costs required to negotiate a
treaty make it a device ill-suited to the purpose of equalizing environmental compliance costs. In
short, the treaty is a fine environmental measure but it falls far short of being an adequate industrial
remedy.
157 See generally U.S. Assistance to Foreign Copper Producers, supra note 4, at 89.
158 Id. See also Acid Control Hearing, supra note 143, at 876.
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nea and Nacozari. Only those two smelters are required to bear (as are
United States producers) the cost of compliance with United States envi-
ronmental regulations. The ability of all other copper producers to exter-
nalize remains unimpaired. The high transaction costs necessary both to
establish a similar treaty with each of the several foreign copper produ-
cers, #nd to police any that are reached, cast doubt on the efficiency of
using such agreements as a means to achieve equalization and internal-
ization of environmental costs.
Another United States policy decision affecting the domestic market
is that of the United States government to reduce its copper purchases.
The change in the copper content of the penny lessened demand by 79
million pounds per year, a 2% market share.' 59 The United States has
historically failed to purchase copper for the strategic stockpile,
purchases which could amount to one million tons of copper, an amount
equal to half of annual apparent domestic consumption." 6° Finally, the
apparent failure of copper to be utilized as the high-level nuclear waste
canister material means the loss of a market for up to two milion tons of
copper, an amount equal to apparent annual domestic consumption.' 6 '
IV. RECENT CONGRESSIONAL AND EXECUTIVE ACTION: FINDING
INJURY, DENYING RELIEF
The domestic copper industry does not wield great political power
in Congress. Copper is produced or smelted in only eight states which
are not widely represented in the United States House of Representa-
tives. 162 Further diminishing the political power of the industry is that
two-thirds of domestically produced copper is mined from a single con-
gressional district in southeastern Arizona.16 3 Despite this lack of broad
congressional support, however, the industry has achieved some legisla-
tive success. Yet, congressional success has often been met by presiden-
159 See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
160 See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
161 See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text; see infra notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
162 Sparsely populated, these eight states are represented by comparatively few members of Con-
gress including, of course, sixteen Senators. Also, copper facilities tend to be located in rural areas, a
fact which further diminishes the political power of the industry. See 133 CONG. REc. S9378 (1987).
Likewise, opposition to copper production by environmental groups is a factor. See, e.g., U.S. Assist-
ance to Foreign Copper Producers, supra note 4.
163 Even further compounding the industry's problems is that the Congressman from that district
(the Fifth Congressional District of Arizona), James Kolbe, is a member of the minority in the
House. To make themselves more effective, members from the copper-producing states formed the
Congressional Copper Caucus, which in the 99th Congress had as members 13 senators and 19
representatives (including the entire Arizona delegation). See generally Bipartisan Congressional
Caucus Hopes to Aid U.S. Ailing Copper Industry's Revival Effort, 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 212
(1985).
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tial opposition, and most major initiatives or opportunities for assistance
to the domestic copper industry remain unenacted. The following sec-
tion analyzes congressional efforts made since the 1982-84 depression.
A. Congressional and Executive Action During the 98th Congress
The 98th Congress was in session during the depth of the depression
in the copper industry, from 1982 to 1984. Two important legislative
initiatives emerged from this Congress, one at least potentially opening a
new market to copper, the other further restricting the use of MDB fundg
for expansion of copper production by borrowing nations. Other more
substantial measures however, were left unenacted. 1' 4
Even though the first initiative failed to become law, it reopened a
potential new market for copper relating to the United States high-level
nuclear waste storage program.'65 At the time, studies were being con-
ducted to identify a material which could be used to construct hundreds
of huge, thick metal canisters into which nuclear wastes could be encased
prior to underground storage.' 66 The United States Department of En-
ergy ("DOE") had determined in its preliminary investigations that
stainless steel was the best material in which to encase the wastes.' 67 Cit-
ing the determination of the Swedish government that wastes stored in
copper canisters were absolutely safe for hundreds of thousands of years,
the copper industry argued that copper was superior to steel for this pur-
pose.' 61 The DOE Secretary stated that the use of copper as a canister
material had been rejected without sufficient consideration and would be
reexamined.' 69 Subsequently, a measure was introduced to authorize a
$4 million study of the feasibility of copper as a canister material, 170 a
study that was never authorized. Nevertheless, DOE subsequently
awarded a $6 million contract to study this application to the Copper
164 See, eg., S. 1544, supra note 2 (directing that copper be purchased for the National Defense
stockpile); H.R. 1318 98th Cong., supra note 2 (restricting imports of copper); H.R. 2413, supra note
2 (increasing duty on imported copper to account for domestic environmental costs).
165 See generally DOE Oversight Hearing, supra note 55, at 25-28, 55-73, 105-211.
166 See generally id at 61-64.
167 Id at 110.
168 Id at 56 (statement of Representative McNulty). Stainless steel containers, in comparison,
would be expected to corrode in less than 300 years. At that time the radioactive waste would be
discharged into the surrounding geological formation, which would thus be the only barrier between
the radioactivity and the biosphere. Id
169 Id. at I1 (statement of DOE Secretary Hodel). It is worth noting that Congressman Udall,
Committee Chairman, represented the southwestern portion of Arizona, an area of significant cop-
per production, and had formerly represented southeastern Arizona.
170 H.R. 5369, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); H.R. 5244, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); H.R. 5245,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
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Development Association.17' Estimates of the potential annual demand
that the use of copper canisters would require vary greatly-from
700,000 to over two million tons.172
The second measure contined for an additional year a temporary
instruction to the United States representatives to the MDBs. They were
advised to oppose loans "for the production of any commodity for ex-
port, if it is in surplus on world markets and if the assistance will cause
substantial injury to the United States producers of the same, similar, or
competing commodity' 1 73 Existing law had been enacted only tempo-
rarily as part of an appropriations bill.' 74
Near the end of the 98th Congress, in a proceeding brought by sev-
eral domestic copper producers under Section 201 of the Trade and
Tariff Act of 1974("§ 201"), 171 the International Trade Commission
("ITC") unanimously found that copper was being "imported into the
United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of
serious injury to the domestic industry .... ,,176 However, the commis-
sioners were not in agreement as to the appropriate relief: two recom-
mended a five year tariff on imported copper, 177 two recommended
import quotas, 178 and one recommended that no relief be granted. 171
President Ronald W. Reagan denied any relief, stating that "granting
import relief is not consistent with our national economic interest," be-
lieving that import restrictions would harm United States copper
fabricators more than they would benefit producers. 180 This outcome
was identical to a 1978 § 201 proceeding in which the ITC found injury
to the domestic industry 8 1 and President Carter denied any relief.'82
171 1985 MINERALS YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at 333.
172 Estimates range from 700,000, DOE Oversight Hearing, supra note 55, at 67, to 1.3 million
tons, id. at 28, to two million tons, id. at 58.
173 Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit.
V, § 524, 98 Stat. 1899 (Oct. 12, 1984).
174 Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1985, Pub. L. No. 97-121, tit.
V, § 552, 95 Stat. 1656 (1981).
175 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982).
176 Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, at 1709.
177 Id. at 1725.
178 Id. at 1716.
179 Id. at 1733.
180 49 Fed. Reg 35,609 (1984).
181 Unalloyed, Unwrought Copper, USITC Pub. 905, Inv. No. TA-201-32 (Aug. 1978).
182 President Carter denied relief on the basis that it was "not in the national economic interest"
because: 1) such relief "would impose significant costs on U.S. consumers;" 2) "domestic copper
market conditions have improved [since the investigation];" 3) such "relief would subject U.S. jobs
in other industries to possible foreign retaliation," and 4) relief would adversely affect United States
relations with Chile, Zambia, and Peru. President's Message to Congress Transmitting his Decision
Against Import Relief on Unwrought, Unalloyed Copper, I PuB. PAPERS 1804 (Oct. 20, 1978).
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Thus, twice in six years the industry was found to have been injured by
increased imports, yet relief was denied.
B. Congressional and Executive Action During the 99th Congress
As in the 98th Congress, the industry achieved some success in the
99th Congress. That Congress approved two limited measures designed
to provide assistance to the domestic copper industry through production
restraints negotiated with foreign copper producers. President Reagan
rejected both. At the same time, significant bills remained
unexamined. 18 3
The 99th Congress approved a bill conveying the sense of Congress
that the President should negotiate "with the principal foreign copper-
producing countries to conclude voluntary restraint agreements with
those governments for the purpose of effecting a balanced reduction of
total annual foreign copper production for a period of between three and
five years ... ,""4 President Reagan decided not to negotiate voluntary
production restraints, stating that such restraints: 1) would be "inconsis-
tent with the overall, market-oriented trade and economic policy objec-
tives of this Administration;" 2) "would raise serious antitrust
concerns;" 3) "would... be inefficient and expensive for the U.S. econ-
omy; ... incur[ring] losses to U.S. consumers substantially in excess of
any gains accruing to U.S. producers;" and, 4) would not "be feasible
either to conclude or implement ..... "I As his alternative, the Presi-
dent stated that "the Department of Labor has developed, and begun to
implement, a plan for a special effort to assist workers displaced from the
copper industry." ' 6
After President Reagan rejected the recommendation by Congress
that he negotiate production restraints, Congress passed a bill requiring
the President to negotiate with principal foreign copper producers in or-
der to obtain voluntary production restraints. 8 7 The President vetoed
183 For bills from the 99th Congress, see supra note 2.
184 Section 247(c)(2) of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2997
(1984).
185 President's Message to Congress Transmitting His Decision Not to Negotiate Voluntary Pro-
duction Restraints on Copper, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1326, 1327 (Oct. 30, 1985)[hereinaf-
ter President's Decision Not To Negotiate].
186 Id. at 1327. Curiously, the Secretary of Labor has sought to deny benefits to workers in
copper industries on the grounds that increased imports did not harm them. See, eg., United Steel-
workers of Am. v. Donovan, 632 F. Supp. 17 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986); Miller v. Donovan, 620 F. Supp.
712 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985). Arguably, the position of the Secretary contradicts both the 1978 and
1984 ITC investigations, and is at odds with the apparent intent of President Reagan.
187 H.R. 1562, supra note 2, § 304(a)(2).
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this bill. 188 The President believed that the bill, if enacted, "would invite
immediate retaliation against our exports resulting in a loss of American
jobs in other areas. Because this bill is so sweeping in its provisions, we
could expect that retaliation to be extensive."
1 89
C. Congressional and Executive Action During the 100th Congress
As in the 98th and 99th Congresses, most bills related to copper
remained unexamined in the 100th Congress.19 ° The only provisions re-
lating to copper being acted upon were certain sections of the omnibus
trade bill-H.R. 3, the Industrial Competitiveness Act of 1987191-
which now has been vetoed. As approved by the Senate, H.R. 3 con-
tained two provisions relating to copper. First, the bill would have im-
posed additional restrictions on the use of MDB funds for the expansion
of foreign copper production capacity. 192 Significantly, if over the objec-
tion of the United States an MDB or the IMF approved a loan for a
commodity in surplus, the United States would have reduced its future
contributions to that institution. 193 Apparently, the belief was that the
threat of reduced United States contributions would have motivated
other members of the institution to vote against such loans. Second,
H.R. 3 would have expanded the definition of what the ITC could have
found to constitute an unreasonable trade practice, under § 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974("§ 301") 19' The new definition would have included
subsidizing production of commodities which were in excess on the
world market.' 95 A domestic copper producer would have thus been
able to petition the ITC for relief from such practices. Even so, the sub-
sequent decision of whether and in what form to grant relief would have
188 President's Message to Congress Vetoing H.R. 1562, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1510
(Dec. 17, 1985)[hereinafter Veto Message].
189 Id. at 1511.
190 The unexamined bills are: S. 316, supra note 2, § 4(a); S. 321, supra note 2, § 6(d); H.R. 1664,
supra note 2, § 187; H.R. 1679, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 187.
191 H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)(Senate version).
192 See generally 133 CONG. REC. S9270-92 (1987).
193 H.R. 3, supra note 191, § 2178-80. The United States would not increase its capital share of
such institution nor replenish funding for that institution, nor permit the letting of a note of credit by
that institution in the United States. Id. § 2179. In addition, in future years the amount paid in by
the United States would be reduced by the amount which the institution had lent over the opposition
of the United States. Id. § 2180. See generally 133 CONG. REC. S9281-84 (1987). Cf S. 220, 100th
Cong. 1st Sess. §§ 2-3 (1987); H.R. 306, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2-3 (1987).
194 19 U.S.C. 241 1(a)(Supp. III 1985).
195 H.R. 3, supra note 191, § 307(c)(3)(B)(i). See generally 133 CONG. REC. S9367-84. The ap-
proach of H.R. 3 is far from comprehensive. Cf S. 1042, 100th Cong., 1st Sess (1987). See generally
133 CONG. REC. S5239-42.
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remained within the discretion of the President.19 6 Thus, the familiar
scenario remained possible under the vetoed legislation: a favorable de-
termination by the ITC, followed by denial of relief by the President.
Thus far during the 100th Congress the President has not denied
relief of any form to the copper industry, if only because no such relief
has been recommended. Indeed, the executive branch has proposed to
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
("UNCTAD") the creation of an intergovernmental forum to monitor
world copper trade and to quicken the exchange of trade information.197
The potential effectiveness and precise role of this agency, should it be
created, is unclear. Apparently, the forum would function to assist cop-
per-producing nations to forecast supply and demand more accurately,
with the hope that they will react to such forecasts. There is also the
agreement that the United States negotiated with Mexico to reduce trans-
boundary air pollution, which to a slight degree assists the domestic
industry. 198
IV. CURRENT PROPOSALS AND PROMISING ALTERNATIVES
The industry has had its successes in Congress and its defeats in the
White House. Over the past decade, two Presidents have denied import
relief to the domestic copper industry despite two determinations by the
ITC and two additional determinations by Congress to the contrary.
The only measures to become law-the restrictive instructions to the
United States representatives to the various MDBs-work, if at all, only
prospectively. They eliminate neither the advantage already conferred
by past loans, nor the incentive of borrower nations to overproduce cop-
per in order to earn foreign capital to meet existing debt service require-
ments. Thus, the industry remains standing in place in terms of
remedies, and it has lost ground (in terms of market share) despite efforts
by the industry that cut production costs by 18%.199 If the industry is to
regain its vitality, additional measures are required. Two bills each from
196 See 133 CONG. REC. S9374 (1987).
197 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 24 (Jan. 7, 1987). See also 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1127, 1128
(Sept. 16, 1987)(United States supports Organization of American States resolution that the United
States continue to oppose efforts to restrict imports of copper into the United States).
198 See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
199 Water Resources Hearing, supra note 71, at 1128. A more recent estimate is that domestic
production costs have been reduced 25% between 1981 and 1985. 133 CONG. REC. S9378 (1987).
Specifically, "[p]roductivity in terms of employee-hours per ton of copper produced at mines in-
creased from 27.4 hours per ton in 1983, to 20.7 hours per ton in 1984, to 17 hours per ton in 1985."
1985 MINERALS YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at 321. The average United States production cost in
1986, including a reasonable return on capital, was 671 per pound. 1986 MINERALS YEARBOOK,
supra note 28, at 5.
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the 99th (H.R. 3714200 and S. 353201) and 100th (S. 1043202 and S.
1042203) Congresses could achieve workable solutions by recognizing the
problems peculiar to the copper industry, and deserve greater
attention.204
Had H.R. 3714 become law, it would have provided a flexible solu-
tion first, by requiring the President to negotiate with foreign copper
producers to limit production to 1983 levels.20 5 If those negotiations
were unsuccessful,206 or if the agreement were reached but not complied
with,20 7 then the President would have been authorized to impose a 15¢
per pound surcharge on imports of copper for a five-year period.20 8
While the primary benefit of requiring the President to undertake the
negotiations while only authorizing him to impose surcharges should
200 H.R. 3714, supra note 2.
201 S. 353, supra note 2.
202 S. 1043, supra note 2.
203 S. 1042, supra note 195. See generally 133 CONG. Rlc. S5239-42 (1987)
204 In addition, had a third measure from the 99th Congress, S. 2815, supra note 2, become law,
its three provisions relating to copper would have substantially benefited the industry. The first
provision provided that the Export-Import Bank "may not guarantee, extend credit, or participate in
an extension of credit in connection with a transaction involving the export of equipment to be used
in copper extraction, production, manufacturing, or smelting operations." Id. § 113(b). The second
provision authorized the President "to enter into negotiations with members of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development to agree to eliminate official financing or support for new
mining or production facilities, and, where possible, to encourage the reduction of commodities from
such facilities, where the commodity is in oversupply . I..." Id. § 113(c). The third provision
authorized the President "to enter into negotiations with the members of each multilateral develop-
ment bank to reach an agreement prohibiting the furnishing of assistance by such bank for any new
mining or production facility for a commodity that is in oversupply .... Id. § 113(d)(l). In short,
the bill was intended to ensure that loan proceeds were used to "support growth and appropriate
policy reform in developing countries and not wasted on expanded production of primary commodi-
ties already in global oversupply and facing shrinking markets and falling prices." Export Revitaliza-
tion Act: Report of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on S. 2815, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1986).
Compare these five bills with, for example, S. 1670, supra note 2 and H.R. 3410, supra note 2,
which would have created a government-to-government International Copper Action Commission.
That commission's purpose would have been to "promote understanding and cooperation," "serve as
a forum for consultations," "develop guidelines for trade," "develop forecasts," and "promote...
copper consumption, research .... and ... market development." While recognizing the world-
wide commodity status of copper, the problem with such an approach is simple. A foreign, state-
owned producer which is motivated primarily by its debt service needs has no rational reason to
agree voluntarily to "develop guidelines for trade" that restrict its ability to export copper to the
United States. Such an approach would also be of dubious value to domestic producers if promo-
tions create new demand which is then filled by imports.
205 H.R. 3714, supra note 2.
206 Id. § 5(a)
207 Id § 5(b).
208 Id. § 5(c).
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those negotiations fail is political,209 authorizing the President to impose
copper surcharges would be a useful bargaining tool. The possibility of a
surcharge might be sufficient to bring foreign producers to voluntarily
reduce production. In addition, the bill seems "fair," as the 15o per
pound surcharge is equal to the cost borne by domestic producers as a
result of the myriad of environmental regulations affecting copper pro-
duction.210 The bill would put domestic producers on equal footing with
foreign producers who are not bound by the environmental regulations of
the United States. Thus the bill would prevent the externalization of pol-
lution, exemplified by the closing of the Douglas smelter and simultane-
ous expansion of the Mexican facilities.21 '
Similarly, had S. 353 become law, the costs incurred by domestic
producers in meeting environmental regulations would have been offset
by imposing, initially, a 15o per pound surcharge on imported copper.2 12
Subsequently, the surcharge would vary, depending upon the actual dif-
ference between foreign and domestic environmental compliance costs.2 13
As with H.R. 3714, the externalization of environmental abuse would be
prevented. In addition, the bill arguably would encourage environmental
goals: foreign producers wishing to adopt more stringent environmental
standards would be able to offset the increase in costs arising from more
stringent standards by tariff-free exportation to the United States.
If the 100th Congress approves S. 1043,214 incentives created by the
CFF to overproduce copper215 would be eliminated by ensuring that
CFF funding would not be available to a country with an earnings
shortfall if that "shortfall was produced by declining prices of a nonagri-
cultural fungible commodity in surplus on world markets, unless the bor-
rowing country... [agrees] to adjust production and not to add further
to excess capacity and to take other necessary action to stabilize the mar-
ket for such commodity." '216 Such a restructuring of the incentives fac-
ing countries receiving balance of payment assistance, away from
overproduction and toward production policies sensitive to supply and
demand, would partially reduce the ability of foreign state-owned copper
producers to overproduce.
209 Because H.R. 3714 is permissive in that it does not require imposition of i tariff or quota, it
may be more palatable to the President.
210 Supra note 149.
211 See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
212 S. 353, supra note 2.
213 Id. § 4(b).
214 S. 1043, supra note 2.
215 See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
216 S. 1043, supra note 2, § l(a). Section 501 of S. 1042, supra note 195, is identical.
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By far the most comprehensive bill introduced thus far in the 100th
Congress is S. 1042,217 a comprehensive trade bill that is intended to aid
the copper industry, although by its terms it affects all nonagricultural,
fungible commodities that are in oversupply.218 In addition to imposing
restrictions identical to S. 1043 on the use of CFF funds,219 the bill would
make several substantive changes. First, the provision of a direct or indi-
rect subsidy to increase production of a nonagricultural, fungible com-
modity "for which the existing worldwide production capacity .. .
significantly exceeds existing worldwide demand" would be defined as an
unreasonable trade practice in a § 301 action.220 If the United States
Trade Representative determines that such overcapacity is being subsi-
dized, then the President must impose an import quota and may grant
other relief.221 In this respect, S. 1042 differs significantly from H.R. 3 in
that it reduces the discretion of the President with respect to a remedy.
The bill would also expand the availability of relief in a § 201 peti-
tion in three ways. First, the concept of "serious injury" would be ex-
panded to include situations where there is a decline in domestic sales, a
growing domestic inventory, decreasing production, and an increase in
worldwide production capacity if such increase is likely to result in in-
creased imports or suppression of the worldwide price of the commod-
ity. 222 Second, the concept of "substantial cause" would be expanded to
include situations involving increasing imports, a declining proportion of
the domestic market produced by domestic producers, and increasing
worldwide production capacity if that increase would decrease or sup-
press the price of the commodity.223 Third, the bill would expand the list
of available remedies to permit the President to choose, or the ITC to
recommend, bilateral negotiations to prevent an injury "if the injury...
is not susceptible to unilateral solution by the United States ....
Thus broadened, the likelihood that the ITC would determine that
the domestic copper industry had been "seriously injured" by nonrespon-
sive production decisions would be increased.
However, given that the ITC has twice made such a determination
under existing statutory defintions, it is not clear that such changes are
217 S. 1042, supra note 195. See generally 133 CONG. REC. S5239-42 (1987)
218 See 133 CONG. REc. S 5239-40 (statement of Senator Domenici).
219 S. 1042, supra note 195, § 501.
220 Id. § 102.
221 Id. § 101(a).
222 Id. § 301(a). Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 is found at 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982 & Supp.
1985).
223 S. 1042, supra note 195, § 301(a).
224 Id. § 303.
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indeed necessary: the problem the copper industry has faced before the
ITC has not been in determining whether an injury has occured. Indeed,
in 1984 the occurence of injury was unanimously agreed upon.225 The
problem that § 201 proceedings have raised to copper producers relates
not to whether there has been sustained an injury, but rather to the
granting of a remedy. In this regard, another provision of S. 1042 would
require that the President, when determining whether to grant relief to a
§ 201 petitioner, consider both the impact on domestic employment and
the extent to which workers in the industry are likely to receive trade
adjustment assistance. 226 In addition, the President would be required to
consider the potential benefits of import relief and efforts being made by
the industry to adjust to increased imports, 227 considerations which are
not now part of the President's determination. To that extent, S. 1042
would increase the likelihood that a successful § 201 petitioner would
actually obtain relief.
Each of these four legislative proposals presents practical problems.
Those from the 99th Congress would raise the price of copper for domes-
tic consumers by increasing the cost of copper to downstream, intermedi-
ate manufacturers, which is the primary reason President Reagan
rejected such relief. Therefore, similar proposals are probably incompati-
ble with the President's economic policy, and not likely to become law.
The two bills before the 100th Congress are quite broad, and have not
garnered much support. Traditional forms of import relief (such as tar-
iffs and quotas) are not likely to receive presidential approval. Given the
lack of a broad base of support in Congress for copper, the possibility of a
congressional override of a presidential veto seems slight. Raising the
price of copper, however, is the most effective solution. Domestic copper
producers need additional capital to increase productivity and efficiency
in order to make up for capital that in recent years has been diverted to
the nonproductive purpose of meeting environmental regulations. z 8
225 See supra text accompanying note 176. In addition, an important and seemingly axiomatic
question is, why would a foreign, state-owned producer voluntarily agree to limit production? For
similar reasons, the additional remedy of seeking a bilateral agreement to reduce overcapacity would
probably prove, in practice, meaningless. See supra note 204.
Finally, S. 1042 would establish as a "principal negotiating objective... [obtaining] an agree-
ment as a part of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT] that imposes sanctions
against the provision.., of government subsidies.., to increase the capacity to produce a nonagri-
cultural, fungible good for which the existing worldwide production capacity... significantly ex-
ceeds existing worldwide demand .... " S. 1042, supra note 195, § 201(a).
226 S. 1042, supra note 195, § 302(c). The bill would also enhance the ability of a § 201 petitioner
to obtain information from foreign countries. See id. § 103(d).
227 Id. § 302(c).
228 Of course, the price of copper may be raised only to the point just below that at which sub-
stantial substitution would occur. See generally notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
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Thus, nontraditional forms of relief are needed.
V. OUTLINE OF A NATIONAL COPPER POLICY: COMPREHENSIVE
COORDINATION AND COOPERATION
To solve the problems confronting the domestic copper industry and
to enable it to regain competitiveness, it is necessary to establish a com-
prehensive national copper policy requiring the efforts of both industry
and government. The domestic copper industry can cooperate and coor-
dinate its actions with the United States government to be more efficient
and productive. The following constitutes an outline of such a policy.
A. Development of New Markets
An increase in demand is critical both as a short-term means of
utilizing the existing surplus production capacity of copper and in the
long term to ensure a continuing market. To that end, any government
determination regarding whether to use copper in a particular applica-
tion should be slightly weighted toward using copper. That is, the gov-
ernment should take into consideration in such a decision not only any
additional cost or other detriment that the use of copper may represent in
that particular application, but also that the use of copper may eliminate
other costs which are only indirectly related to the particular application.
Simply put, the "cost" of using copper can be defined narrowly (that is,
nearly synonomously with "expenditures") or broadly (that is, more in
line with the idea of "social costs"). The government should look at the
broad definition.229 For instance, the main disadvantage cited by the De-
partment of Energy for using copper as a nuclear waste canister material
was that copper canisters would add approximately 10% to the program
cost (a narrow view).23° Yet, using copper would create a new demand
for two million tons of copper, demand which would eliminate direct
costs, such as unemployment benefits and retraining programs for former
copper workers.231 It would also provide indirect savings by avoiding a
229 Compare this approach to S. 1042, supra note 195, § 302, discussed infra note 231 and accom-
panying text, which would require that when the President considers whether or not to grant import
relief, the potential impact on domestic employment and the extent to which trade adjustment assist-
ance would be implicated would be taken into account. In these terms S. 1042 § 302 would require
the President take the broad view of cost.
230 DOE Oversight Hearing, supra note 55, at 58.
231 The use of copper canisters was estimated to add an additional $1 billion to $10 billion a
project. Id. at 28. In comparison, President Reagan noted some $63 million was available under just
the Job Training Partnership Act for displaced copper workers. President's Decision Not to Negoti-
ate supra note 185, at 2. See, e.g., 1985 MINERALS YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at 321 ($2.6 million
grant to aid unemployed copper miners); see also 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1551 (Dec. 11, 1985)(430
copper and Nickel workers eligible for trade adjustment assistance); 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) at
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more costly alternative-purchasing the more expensive copper might be
a less costly alternative than, for example, imposing a surcharge or
quota.
For similar reasons, reconsideration of the decision to reduce the
copper content of pennies by substituting zinc for copper may be in or-
der, especially in light of the fact that the actual selling price of copper is
well below what was predicted.232 While this does not mean that copper
should be utilized wholly without regard to cost, in cases where copper is
in other respects more or less equal, some (perhaps slight) extra weight
should be given to copper if the primary reason for not selecting copper
is related to (in the narrow sense of the concept) its cost.
Further, when demand is otherwise declining or the price is widely
fluctuating downward, the government should purchase copper for the
strategic stockpile. Not only has the government determined that copper
is a strategic material, it has also determined it is in the national interest
to have it sufficiently stockpiled. Also, a coordinated purchasing pro-
gram by the government designed to level the widely ranging demand for
copper would decrease its price volatility, a factor greatly deterring its
use.2 33 Obviously, this could only operate in the short term and as a
limited market. 234 Yet, in times of price volatility, lessened demand, or
overproduction, government purchases could at least be used in the short
term to stabilize the price of copper.
A third new market could be developed through the initiative of the
copper industry working in close coordination with the government to
promote new uses for copper.235 The domestic copper industry should
actively support MDB loans for the electrification and industrialization
1161 (Sept. 18, 1985)(1900 copper products workers eligible). That $63 million was, of course, in
addition to other costs directly attributable to the depression in the copper industry, such as unem-
ployment compensation for displaced workers and lost tax revenues caused by shutdowns. Also,
under § 222 of the Trade Act of 1974, the group of workers eligible to receive trade adjustment
assistance is defined more broadly than only actual copper workers. See Miller v. Donovan, 620 F.
Supp. 712 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985)(railway workers claim adjustment assistance because increased
imports of copper caused closure of mine; claim denied on basis of lack of causal link to increasing
imports). Thus, retraining and unemployment costs are not limited solely to actual copper workers,
and this fact should be taken into account.
232 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. Likewise, the costs involved in coining a proposed
$1 coin, to be made primarily of copper, should be carefully examined.
233 "A national stockpile may... be employed to stabilize the volume of demand and supply in
the national market and thereby indirectly contribute to price stabilization." R. MIKESELL, supra
note 3, at 201.
234 Should the government determine to buy 1 million tons of copper, such a program would cost
$1.34 billion at 67 per pound.
235 See generally R. PRAIN, supra note 20, at 169-84 (history of industry promotion techniques).
In addition, private industrial uses for copper should be encouraged. For example, two new poten-
tial markets for copper involve applications in electronic vehicles and heat pumps. 1985 MINERALS
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of developing countries, and as appropriate, should cooperate with for-
eign countries to secure such loans to them. For its part, the government
must ensure that domestic copper producers are provided with the op-
portunity to fill the demand created by such new loans by, for example:
1) recommending that MDB executive directors fully inform United
States firms of bidding opportunities in recipient nations; 2) assisting
those firms in focusing on projects in which they have a special interest
or advantage; 3) helping those firms complete and submit bids; 4) investi-
gating complaints relating to the awarding of contracts; and 5) ensuring
that contract procedures are observed by the recipient nation.2 3 6
B. Providing Limited Import Relief
Because of the unique global market for copper, a quota or tariff is a
necessary, though limited, element in the national copper policy.
The only extant methods of effectively insulating the U.S. market from the
price vicissitudes of globally traded commodities are found in the agricul-
tural price-support programs. These in general establish potentially huge
buffers of government financed stocks. U.S. prices are carefully controlled
by manipulation of the price-support levels. Even with such complex
mechanisms, import relief under section 22 is provided as a back-up to pro-
tect the programs from interference. No such price support buffer exists for
any non-agricultural product. Very few U.S. industrial products like copper
enjoy a world commodity status.2 37
Any national copper policy must recognize this fact. Foreign producers,
especially foreign copper producers who have large foreign debt service
requirements, have not and will not reduce production voluntarily, even
during times when such reductions are economically sound. Therefore, a
quota or tariff is a necessary part of a national copper policy.
Tariffs and quotas, however, are extreme measures and should be
used only as a last resort. One alternative is first to attempt reaching
voluntary production restraints and to impose tariffs or quotas only if
such negotiations fail. As noted previously, President Reagan has re-
jected voluntary negotiations. There is no reason to believe he has
changed his policy since rejecting the recommendations of both Congress
and the ITC. A second alternative, one that better meets the problem, is
to have quotas or tariffs triggered by certain market conditions.238 For
YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at 333. The domestic industry should help to develop such applications.
The government, too, should encourage their development.
236 See S. 2815, supra note 2, § 301(c)(1). Cf H.R. 3, supra note 191, § 1801(a).
237 Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, at 1725 n.5 (emphasis added).
238 An analogous approach can be found at 42 U.S.C. § 2201(v)(1982), which provides that the
Department of Energy, "to the extent necessary to assure the maintenance of a viable domestic
uranium industry, shall not offer ... [uranium enrichment] services for source or special nuclear
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example, if imports exceed a certain level, or if the LME or COMEX
price remains below a certain price for a specified period of time, then a
tariff or quota would be triggered. If the purpose of a quota or tariff is to
force foreign producers to heed market conditions, then creating artificial
and clear delineations of supply and demand (defined by the United
States) may encourage foreign producers to produce copper in closer ap-
proximation to demand.
C. Limitations on the Use of United States Contributions to the IMF
and the MDBs
There are two obvious conditions which should be examined. To
reduce supply directly, funding could be made conditional upon limiting
production or capacity to a certain level. Such a condition would operate
directly to reduce supply. The second alternative is to make funding con-
ditional upon the foreign producers' compliance with the Clean Air Act
or some equally stringent standard. This condition would serve both to
equalize production costs and to reduce transboundary air pollution and
acid rain by reducing the ability of the foreign producer to externalize
this pollution.239
In addition, CFF balance-of-payment financing should be restruc-
tured. Not only does the availability of CFF financing enhance the abil-
ity of foreign state-owned copper producers to overproduce, it
encourages them to do so.24 One seemingly extreme and overinclusive
measure would abolish the CFF.24 1 In contrast, S. 1043 would eliminate
incentives to overproduce by denying loans to countries producing excess
commodities unless they agree to limit production.242 S. 1043, and par-
ticularily this provision, deserves serious consideration, especially in light
of the vetoed H.R. 3 bill.
materials of foreign origin intended for use in... the United States." However, a similar provision
relating to copper should carefully define under what circumstances a quota or tariff would be trig-
gered. Cf Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Huffmnan, 825 F.2d 1430 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 56
U.S.L.W. 3459 (Jan. 11, 1988)(No. 87-645).
239 See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
240 See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
241 H.R. Res. 149, supra note 2 (1987). To argue for abolition of the CFF is to argue either that
there is no need for general balance of payment assistance or that the value of any such assistance is
outweighed by the role of the CFF in encouraging overproduction. There does not seem to be
evidence overwhelmingly in support of either proposition. That is not to say that the CFF does not
create the wrong incentives: CFF financing should be restructured. But, the issue is not whether, but
rather under what circumstances and upon what conditions CFF assistance should be available.
242 S. 1043, supra note 2, § l(a).
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D. Research and Development Assistance
"Research is the very last thing that an industry can neglect and
hope to survive in an increasingly competitive world." '243 Relative to for-
eign producers, the domestic industry is at a distinct advantage because
of lower ore content. The resulting extra expense is incurred during the
milling stage, when relative to foreign producers, domestic producers
must separate greater amounts of waste from the copper ore.244 In all
aspects of production, and especially milling, government grants could be
made for specific research projects designed to discover methods and
practices to lower production costs of domestic producers. Assistance in
this area is critical because in the past, there has been insufficient profit to
fund research.2 4 5
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States copper industry is presently experiencing a recov-
ery from the worst depression in its history. One of the reasons for the
recovery is that the industry responded by dramatically lowering its pro-
duction costs to become a leaner, more competitive producer. However,
in order to protect the industry's progress and future health, the United
States should adopt a comprehensive national copper policy. The indus-
try has been running hard for nearly a decade, and a national copper
policy might very well give it the second wind it needs.
David Hricik
243 R. PRAIN, supra note 20, at 165.
244 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
245 In late 1987, $4 million was made available to establish the Center for Advanced Studies for
Copper Recovery and Utilization at the University of Arizona. UA's Share of Federal Package to
Build Copper Center, Farm Lab, Ariz. Daily Star, Dec. 23, 1987, § A, at 4, col. 1. Such efforts
should be expanded because "further progress in improving these [production] efficiencies appears to
have been hampered by the inability of the domestic industry to generate greater revenues due to the
low level of world copper prices." Unwrought Copper, supra note 8, at 1714 n.38. In short, the lack
of profitability in the industry has restricted its ability to modernize. Id. at 1712.
